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A TROUBLING COLLISION: OVERBROAD COERCION
STATUTES AND UNCHECKED STATE PROSECUTORS
ABSTRACT
Overbroad laws trespass on First Amendment rights of expression.
Overbroad coercion statutes, which prohibit communication limiting a
listener’s legitimate options, exist in a variety of states and municipalities. By
failing to narrowly prohibit unlawful coercive speech, these overbroad statutes
criminalize a broad range of protected First Amendment speech. These statutes
can be particularly problematic for political actors because they can
criminalize political bargains and discussion characteristic of the American
political system.
As the crime control model has grown, state prosecutors’ charging power
and discretion have vastly increased. Prosecutors face few meaningful checks
on their behavior from other branches of government, but they can use
overbroad coercion statutes to bring felony charges against—and therefore
exert significant leverage over—political opponents. Using the Governor
James R. “Rick” Perry indictment as a case study, this Comment explores the
danger posed to legislators, executives, and judges by unconstitutionally
overbroad coercion statutes in the hands of unchecked prosecutors.
This Comment argues for a judicial and legislative response to this
problem and explains why legislators and judges should have a strong interest
in invalidating and narrowing these overbroad coercion statutes. Ultimately,
this Comment proposes a framework through which judges should invalidate
these statutes and describes why legislators have a duty both to the
Constitution and to themselves to proactively narrow these statutes to avoid
overbreadth.
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INTRODUCTION
An overbroad law is one that infringes on individuals’ rights to engage in
protected First Amendment expression.1 State statutes prohibiting coercive
speech are an important example of the type of law the overbreadth doctrine
targets. Although coercion statutes are designed to prohibit communication
that “actually reduces a listener’s legitimate options,”2 many state coercion
statutes also criminalize a substantial amount of protected “everyday”
communication.3 These overbroad coercion statutes can criminalize a broad
range of speech and political discourse.4
Narrowing overbroad coercion statutes is necessary in large part because of
the growth of prosecutorial power over the last few decades.5 In fact,
prosecutors enjoy virtually unchecked charging power and discretion,6 and
overbroad laws provide temptation for prosecutors to target opposing
politicians for prosecution.7 The American governmental atmosphere is filled

1 Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REV. 844, 859 (1970) (“Overbreadth
may be conceptualized as legislative failure to focus explicitly and narrowly on social harms which are the
valid concern of government and are the justification for interfering with expressive activities.”); see United
States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 262, 268 (1967).
2 Comment, Coercion, Blackmail, and the Limits of Protected Speech, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 1469, 1472–
73 (1983) (defining the type of “dangerous” coercive speech that should be criminally prosecuted; prosecution
would be justified, for example, where “a gangster . . . threatened to break a tavern owner’s legs unless he
voted for a certain political candidate. The threat forces the tavern owner to choose between two things—the
right to be free from physical assault and the right to vote according to individual conscience—when the tavern
owner has a legitimate claim to both things”).
3 See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 163.275 (1980), invalidated by State v. Robertson, 649 P.2d 569, 580
(Or. 1982), superseded by statute, OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 163.275 (West 1985) (“A person commits the crime
of coercion when he compels or induces another person to engage in conduct from which he has a legal right
to abstain, or to abstain from engaging in conduct in which he has a legal right to engage, by means of
instilling in him a fear that, if the demand is not complied with, the actor or another will . . . (c) engage in other
conduct constituting a crime. . . (e) Expose a secret or publicize an asserted fact, whether true or false, tending
to subject some person to hatred, contempt, or ridicule . . . [or] (h) Use or abuse his position as a public servant
by performing some act within . . . his official duties . . . in such a manner as to affect some person
adversely.”).
4 See, e.g., Robertson, 649 P.2d at 580; State v. Hanson, 793 S.W.2d 270, 273 (Tex. App. 1990).
Statutes can be so broad that they criminalize ordinary political expression such as exchanging votes for a bill,
or exacting a promise to support certain legislation. Robertson, 649 P.2d at 580.
5 See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons from
Administrative Law, 61. STAN. L. REV. 869, 870–71, 873 (2009).
6 See, e.g., Donald A. Dripps, Overcriminalization, Discretion, Waiver: A Survey of Possible Exit
Strategies, 109 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1155, 1156, 1161, 1168 (2004).
7 See id. at 1159 n.13 (suggesting that there are reasons to believe prosecutors are abusing their power
because of the “lesson[s] of history; arbitrary power is rarely exercised benignly”); see also John L. Diamond,
Reviving Lenity and Honest Belief at the Boundaries of Criminal Law, 44 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 1, 1 (2010)
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with political bargains, even “threats” of sorts—“If you vote for this federal
bill, I’ll vote against this state law that you like”—and other similar phrases.8
An overbroad coercion statute can criminalize this type of everyday political
language9 and therefore poses an enticing opportunity for prosecutors to
investigate, indict, and punish political opponents.
The presence of overbroad coercion statutes in the hands of unchecked
prosecutors thus signals a troubling imbalance of powers: while prosecutors
experience few meaningful checks from legislators and executives, the threat
of indictment for making a political threat may be one of the most powerful
forms of leverage that prosecutors can exert on these individuals.
This problem is exemplified by the August 2014 indictment10 of former
Texas Governor James R. “Rick” Perry.11 The second count of Perry’s
indictment criminalized his threat to veto a spending bill in the event that
Travis County District Attorney Rosemary Lehmberg refused to resign after
her arrest for Driving While Intoxicated (DWI).12 Because of its severe
overbreadth problem, Texas’s coercion statute technically criminalizes Perry’s
act of making a political threat to exercise his veto power, and Lehmberg’s unit
chose to begin an investigation against Perry under that statute’s authority.13
Granted, the Texas Court of Appeals recognized the problem and invalidated
the indictment,14 but the court could have created a more substantial precedent,
and the decision hardly solves the larger problem of prosecutors potentially
(“The problem of a fluid rather than a fixed line for criminality is that prosecutorial discretion becomes central
to the application of the state’s imposition of criminal sanctions.”).
8 Brief of Constitutional and Criminal Law Experts as Amici Curiae in Support of the Application for a
Writ of Habeas Corpus at 14, Ex parte James Richard “Rick” Perry, 2015 WL 4514696 (Tex. Ct. App. Aug.
12, 2015) (No. 03-15-00063-CR), 2015 WL 1839270, at *22 [hereinafter Expert Amicus Brief].
9 See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. ANN.163.275 (1980), invalidated by State v. Robertson, 649 P.2d 569, 580
(Or. 1982), superseded by statute, OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 163.275 (West 1985); State v. Robertson, 649 P.2d
569, 580 (Or. 1982).
10 Timeline: The Rick Perry Indictment, TEX. TRIB. (last visited Nov. 7, 2015), http://www.
texastribune.org/timeline/perry-indictment/.
11 Governor Perry stepped down from his position as Governor of Texas in January 2015. Manny
Fernandez, Texas’ New Governor Echoes the Plans of Perry, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2015), http://www.
nytimes.com/2015/01/21/us/politics/new-texas-governor-greg-abbott-expected-to-continue-on-perrys-path.
html. Greg Abbott is currently Texas’s governor. Id. However, Governor Perry chose not to run for re-election
in 2013, over a year before his indictment. Aaron Blake, Rick Perry Won’t Seek Reelection, WASH. POST (July
8, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/wp/2013/07/08/rick-perry-wont-seek-reelection/.
12 See, e.g., Expert Amicus Brief, supra note 8, at 3.
13 See Timeline: The Rick Perry Indictment, supra note 10.
14 See Ex parte James Richard “Rick” Perry, No. 03-15-00063-CR, 2015 WL 4514696, at *31 (Tex. Ct.
App. July 24, 2015); Patrick Svitek, State Attorney Set to Appeal Decision That Favored Perry, TEX. TRIB.
(Aug. 12, 2015), https://www.texastribune.org/2015/08/12/state-planning-challenge-pro-perry-decision/.
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using overbroad statutes as a tool to punish and control political opponents.
This Comment posits a method for other government actors to prevent these
kinds of unduly strategic prosecutions in the future.
This Comment proposes that because trying to curb prosecutorial charging
power is in many ways an exercise in futility, this problem should be handled
in two ways. First, defense attorneys should raise and courts should consider
overbreadth challenges in every coercion prosecution. If the statutes are
overbroad, state court judges should invalidate the statutes through an
overbreadth analysis modeled on the Oregon Supreme Court’s decision in
State v. Robertson and its subsequent jurisprudence.15 Second, in the event that
coercion charges have not yet been filed, legislatures should proactively
evaluate their states’ coercion statutes for overbreadth problems and tailor
them where necessary.
This Comment proceeds in four parts. First, Part I provides a background
on the Supreme Court overbreadth doctrine and then explains state
implementation of the overbreadth doctrine in the context of coercion statutes,
using the Oregon approach defined in State v. Robertson as a springboard.16
Second, Part II explains the recent growth of prosecutorial power and discusses
legislative, executive, and judicial strategies for curtailing that power. Then,
Part III uses the Governor Perry indictment as a case study to show the
dangerous collision of overbroad coercion statutes and prosecutorial power.
Finally, Part IV proposes the adoption of the Robertson framework by state
judiciaries and advocates for legislative narrowing of state coercion statutes.
I. BACKGROUND: OVERBREADTH ANALYSIS AND COERCION STATUTES
This first section in this Part discusses the development of the Supreme
Court’s overbreadth doctrine and explains how the Court analyzes overbroad
statutes. The second section of this Part examines the nature of state coercion
statutes and discusses State v. Robertson,17 a particularly useful state supreme
court decision that, this Comment argues, created an ideal framework for
analyzing overbroad state coercion statutes.

15 See State v. Stoneman, 920 P.2d 535 (Or. 1996); State v. Plowman, 838 P.2d 558 (Or. 1992) (en banc);
State v. Robertson, 649 P.2d 569 (Or. 1982).
16 649 P.2d at 587–88.
17 See id.
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A. Supreme Court Overbreadth Analysis
This section explains the development of the overbreadth doctrine by the
Supreme Court over the course of the twentieth century. It shows how the
doctrine originally developed, explains the difference between the overbreadth
doctrine and the alternate as-applied method for constitutional challenges, and
addresses the Court’s continuing developments of the doctrine.
Until the mid-twentieth century, the Supreme Court used an as-applied
balancing test to evaluate overbroad laws.18 In that approach, the Court judged
the constitutionality of a law based on whether the law specifically infringed
upon the rights of the particular individual bringing the action.19 This asapplied method balances the importance of the legislative policy advanced by
the law against the specific expression in which the individual bringing the suit
had tried to engage.20 If the Court finds that the law overreached by prohibiting
the particular expression at issue, the as-applied method “allows the law to
operate where it might do so constitutionally,” while also “vindicat[ing] a
claimant who shows that his own conduct is within the [F]irst
[A]mendment.”21
As the twentieth century progressed, the Court began to develop a new
position on overbroad statutes, a position known as the overbreadth doctrine.22
The modern overbreadth doctrine originated in Thornhill v. Alabama, where
the Supreme Court held that a statute that broadly swept over and thus
prohibited protected communications was facially invalid.23 The Court further
developed the overbreadth doctrine in United States v. Robel, rejecting the
prior as-applied balancing approach in favor of facial challenges, holding that
“when legitimate legislative concerns are expressed in a statute which imposes
a substantial burden on protected First Amendment activities, Congress must
achieve its goal by means which have a ‘less drastic’ impact on the continued
vitality of First Amendment freedoms.”24 Although the Court explained that it
18

See Note, supra note 1, at 844.
See id.
20 See id.; see also Kuntz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 304 (1951) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
21 Note, supra note 1, at 844.
22 See, e.g., Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 602 (1973); Note, supra note 1, at 846.
23 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Making Sense of Overbreadth, 100 YALE L.J. 853, 863 (1991); see Thornhill v.
Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 105 (1940) (“We hold that the danger . . . is neither so serious nor so imminent as to
justify the sweeping proscription of freedom of discussion embodied in [the challenged statute].”).
24 389 U.S. 258, 268 (1966); see also Note, supra note 1, at 845 (noting the overbreadth doctrine “may
condemn a statute which comprehends a range of applications against privileged activity even though the
interests it promotes outweigh the infringement of [F]irst [A]mendment liberties”).
19
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measured the validity of the challenged statute’s goals against First
Amendment protections, it explicitly stated that it had “in no way ‘balanced’
those respective interests.”25
Professor Lewis D. Sargentich’s leading piece on the overbreadth doctrine
highlights the Court’s standard and process for engaging in overbreadth
analyses.26 First, for the Court to even undertake an overbreadth analysis, the
type of expression or conduct affected by the challenged law must be so
substantially involved in First Amendment interests that a legislative failure to
narrowly focus the law would result in a chilling effect.27 Next, Sargentich
explained, the Court must assess the statute’s “area of impact” to determine
whether the conduct affected by the law is to a “substantial extent . . . the kind
of expressive and associational behavior which at least has a colorable claim”
to First Amendment protection.28 Finally, if the law is unconstitutionally
overbroad, the Court may attempt to save it by creating a per se rule of
privilege, “carv[ing] away a class of applications that represents substantially
all of a law’s impermissible coverage.”29 In the doctrine’s earlier years, the
Court almost always chose to facially invalidate challenged statutes instead of
carving out these narrow rules.30 Although recently the Court has retreated
slightly from its original proclivity toward facial invalidation,31 Professor
Matthew D. Adler has argued that “many, perhaps even most of the Court’s

25

Robel, 389 U.S. at 268 n.20.
See Note, supra note 1, at 859.
27 Id.; see infra note 39 and accompanying text (explaining the “chilling effect”).
28 Note, supra note 1, at 860.
29 Id. at 885; see also Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973) (“The consequence of our
departure from traditional rules of standing in the First Amendment area is that any enforcement of a statute
thus placed at issue is totally forbidden until and unless a limiting construction or partial invalidation so
narrows it as to remove the seeming threat . . . to constitutionally protected expression.” (emphasis added)).
30 See David M. Prentiss, Comment, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine and the Nature of the
Judicial Review Power, 25 NEW ENG. L. REV. 989, 1001 (1991) (“The overbreadth doctrine was frequently
used by courts during the 1960s . . . . [At that time], the Court wielded the overbreadth doctrine like a quick
sword to guard against what the Court considered to be government attempts to violate the freedom of
speech.”); see also Note, supra note 1, at 884 (identifying only two laws for which the Court ever created a per
se rule to ameliorate overbreadth before 1970: state laws protecting an individual’s interests in his personal
reputation from defamation and federal laws suppressing obscenity (first citing A Book Named “John
Cleland’s Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure” v. Attorney Gen., 383 U.S. 413, 418 (1966); then citing New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 272 (1964); and then citing Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476
(1957))).
31 See Prentiss, supra note 30, at 1004 (explaining the Court’s higher standard for facial invalidation
articulated in Broadrick: “The Court concluded that even when a statute was overbroad and therefore had
some potential chilling effect . . . there came a point when the chilling effect could not justify invalidating the
statute on its face[:] . . . . when the overbreadth was less than ‘substantial’”).
26
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constitutional decisions sustaining rights-claims against conduct-regulating
rules are [still] facial invalidations.”32
Sargentich has suggested that the optimal solution to remedy overbroad
statutes is for the judiciary to return the challenged statute to the legislature for
re-drafting because, while the courts may interpret the law, the power of
statutory construction rests solely in the legislatures’ hands.33 By re-writing the
statutory text sua sponte, courts run the risk of violating “a clear legislative
intent.”34
Although the as-applied method for challenging overbroad laws is still
accepted and available for use in constitutional challenges,35 the Court’s facial
overbreadth doctrine focuses on the need for sweeping reform.36 The doctrine
suggests that the importance of prohibiting overbroad statutes goes beyond
simply curing individual constitutional violations.37 Hence, an individual
challenging an overbroad statute can “prevail, regardless of the character of his
own activity, by showing that the challenged law comprehends a range of
applications against protected conduct.”38 The element of “setting up”
another’s rights through a facial challenge prevents a “chilling effect” on
speech.39 An overbroad statute not only chills free expression because people

32 Matthew D. Adler, Rights Against Rules: The Moral Structure of American Constitutional Law,
97 MICH. L. REV. 1, 128 n.425 (1998).
33 See Note, supra note 1, at 893, 898.
34 Id. at 893.
35 See id. at 911; see also State v. Rangel, 977 P.2d 379, 386–87 (Or. 1999) (explaining that the
defendant could still attempt an as-applied challenge to a law that failed the overbreadth doctrine).
36 See Note, supra note 1, at 846.
37 See id. at 856–57.
38 Id. at 856. The Court explained standing for overbreadth challenges in Broadrick:

[T]he Court has altered its traditional rules of standing to permit—in the First Amendment area—
“attacks on overly broad statutes with no requirement that the person making the attack
demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn with the requisite
narrow specificity.” Litigants, therefore, are permitted to challenge a statute not because their
own rights of free expression are violated, but because of a judicial . . . assumption that the
statute’s very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally
protected speech or expression.
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973) (citations omitted) (quoting Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380
U.S. 479, 486 (1965)).
39 See Note, supra note 1, at 848; see also David L. Franklin, Facial Challenges, Legislative Purpose,
and the Commerce Clause, 92 IOWA L. REV. 41, 55 (2006) (“In an overbreadth case . . . the claimant is
permitted to raise a claim of facial invalidity largely because of a judicial concern that the challenged statute
would otherwise chill the protected expression of parties other than the claimant. Thus, in effect, the
overbreadth claimant vindicates the constitutional rights of third parties not before the Court.”).
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fear prosecution, but it also disincentivizes others from challenging the statute;
facial invalidation remedies this concern.40
However, because the facial overbreadth doctrine often invalidates entire
statutes instead of carving out narrow as-applied exceptions,41 the doctrine
must be considered “strong medicine.”42 The Court in Broadrick v. Oklahoma
explained that “overbreadth of a statute must not only be real, but substantial
as well, judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.”43
Likewise, the Court warned of the difficulty of determining the precise scope
of a statute when drafting it;44 if courts were to strike down every law that
created even a single impermissible infringement on protected speech, such
action would severely affect the balance of power between the legislature and
the judiciary.45 When such “strong medicine” is necessary, however, the facial
overbreadth doctrine allows courts to broadly invalidate statutes that infringe
on First Amendment freedoms, as opposed to the as-applied method of
providing only individualized relief for a defendant who suffered from the
statute’s specific overreach.46
B. State Coercion Statutes & the Robertson Overbreadth Analysis
Multiple state coercion statutes prohibit a “broad range”47 of protected
speech under the First Amendment (and its state constitutional equivalents).48
Because these statutes’ overbroad language potentially criminalizes a
substantial amount of communication, the statutes provide prime examples of
40 See Note, supra note 1, at 854–55 (explaining that because the as-applied method requires individuals
to “test” the constitutional issue by engaging in the prohibited speech, facing prosecution, and then appealing
their cases to receive overbreadth review from a higher court, they were discouraged from challenging
overbroad statutes).
41 See, e.g., supra note 32 and accompanying text.
42 Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 613.
43 Id. at 615.
44 See id.; see also Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 114–15 (1972) (“The crucial question [in
an overbreadth inquiry], then, is whether the ordinance sweeps within its prohibitions what may not be
punished under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.”).
45 See Doug Linder, The Doctrines of Substantial Overbreadth and Vagueness, EXPLORING CONST.
CONFLICTS (Nov. 7, 2014), http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/conlaw/overbreadth.html.
46 Note, supra note 1, at 870–71 (“In sum, piecemeal excision [under the as-applied test] is not
responsive to the policy which chiefly supports the overbreadth doctrine: the need for judicial alacrity in
dissipating the chilling effect of overbroad statutes.”).
47 See, e.g., United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 265–66 (1967) (invalidating a statute prohibiting a
“broad range of associational activities”).
48 See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 163.275 (1980), invalidated by State v. Robertson, 649 P.2d 569, 580
(Or. 1982), superseded by statute, OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 163.275 (West 1985).
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targets for judicial oversight.49 When state legislatures pass these statutes, the
duty falls to state courts to protect the rights to free speech and expression
outlined in the First Amendment and in state constitutions.50
However, the duty of state courts to perform narrowing inquiries under the
overbreadth doctrine is relatively new.51 Although there have been some state
court decisions that have narrowed and invalidated overbroad coercion
statutes,52 state courts, with the exception of Oregon,53 have yet to
meaningfully explore the overbreadth problems posed by many of these
statutes on a broad scale.54
1. Coercion Statutes & Scholarly Criticism
In recent years, some scholars have noticed the inherent danger posed by
far-reaching and ambiguous criminal coercion statutes.55 For example, one
49 See Note, supra note 1, at 860; see, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 163.275 (1980), invalidated by State
v. Robertson, 649 P.2d 569, 580 (Or. 1982), superseded by statute, OR. REV. STAT. ANN. 163.275 (West
1985); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 1.07(a)(9), 36.03(a) (West 2011).
50 See, e.g., OR. CONST. art. I, § 8; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 8; see also Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652,
666 (1925) (“[W]e . . . assume that freedom of speech . . . which [is] protected by the First Amendment from
abridgement by Congress—[is] among the fundamental personal rights and ‘liberties’ protected by the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the States.”).
51 See Jack Landau, Hurrah for Revolution: A Critical Assessment of State Constitutional Interpretation,
79 OR. L. REV. 793, 808–09 (2000) (explaining that until the 1970s, state constitutional jurisprudence
commonly followed federal jurisprudence). However, in the 1970s, states began to be “openly reactive to
federal constitutional jurisprudence,” especially in more liberal states opposed to “what they perceived as
unacceptably conservative federal constitutional decisions.” Id. at 809–11.
52 See Christopher P. Lu, Recent Developments, The Role of State Courts in Narrowing Overbroad
Speech Laws After Osborne v. Ohio, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 253, 254–55 (1990) (explaining that the decision
in Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990), was “an implicit invitation to state courts to engage in substantial
narrowing of overbroad speech laws”).
53 See State v. Robertson, 649 P.2d 569, 571 (Or. 1982); see also Landau, supra note 51, at 843
(describing Robertson and noting that “the Oregon Supreme Court articulated, in an entirely novel fashion, the
scope of the protection that article I, section 8 affords against overbroad enactments”).
54 That said, a few courts have evaluated coercion statutes’ overbreadth and constitutionality after
Robertson. See State v. Steiger, 781 P.2d 616, 619 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989); Whimbush v. People, 869 P.2d 1245,
1247 (Colo. 1994) (en banc); Feinberg v. Butler, No. 25255, 2004 WL 1822869, at *1, *4, *6 (Haw. Ct. App.
Aug. 12, 2004) (unpublished disposition); People v. Feldman, 791 N.Y.S.2d 361, 381, 383 n.15 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
2005); State v. Hanson, 793 S.W.2d 270, 271 (Tex. App. 1990); City of Seattle v. Ivan, 856 P.2d 1116, 1118
(Wash. Ct. App. 1993).
55 See, e.g., James Lindgren, Unraveling the Paradox of Blackmail, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 670, 679 (1984);
Kate L. Rakoczy, Comment, On Mock Funerals, Banners, and Giant Rat Balloons: Why Current
Interpretation of Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the National Labor Relations Act Unconstitutionally Burdens Union
Speech, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 1621, 1624 (2007) (“There is no easy way to judge the legality of . . . [certain
protests] . . . because courts and the [NLRB] have consistently failed to articulate the key elements of
coercion.”); Comment, supra note 2, at 1473–74.
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student commentator argued that “[c]oercive speech analysis . . . does not
justify . . . criminal coercion statutes to the extent that they proscribe threats to
commit an act that is neither a crime nor a tort.”56 Professors Paul H. Robinson
and Jane A. Grall noted that a New Jersey criminal coercion statute lacked
precise definitions, leaving the statute to only “hint at . . . specific culpability
requirements,” without fully outlining them, which the authors believe would
“no doubt generate unnecessary litigation.”57 Significantly, even the breadth of
the Model Penal Code’s (MPC) criminal coercion statute has been criticized.58
For states that have adopted this provision of the MPC, this statute could lead
to future coercion-statute challenges.
Oregon led the states in addressing a criminal coercion statute’s
overbreadth in 1982.59 In State v. Robertson,60 the Oregon Supreme Court
considered a state coercion statute that criminalized “compel[ling] or
induc[ing] another person to engage in conduct from which he has the legal
right to abstain by causing him to fear the disclosure of discreditable assertions
about some person.”61 At the time, Robertson was revolutionary because the
Oregon Supreme Court was the first state court to extensively analyze “how
definitions of criminal coercion can touch protected speech.”62 The Robertson
court declared the state coercion statute unconstitutionally overbroad and
invalidated the statute.63 Perhaps the most significant takeaway from the
Robertson opinion was articulated almost twenty years later in State v.
Ciancanelli: “[L]aws must focus on proscribing the pursuit or accomplishment
of forbidden results rather than on the suppression of speech or writing.”64
The Robertson court asserted that overbroad statutes arise when legislatures
“reach[] into constitutionally protected ground.”65 Mirroring elements of the
56

Comment, supra note 2, at 1473–74 (footnote omitted).
Paul H. Robinson & Jane A. Grall, Element Analysis in Defining Criminal Liability: The Model Penal
Code and Beyond, 35 STAN. L. REV. 681, 706 n.112 (1983).
58 Lindgren, supra note 55, at 709 n.207.
59 See State v. Robertson, 649 P.2d 569, 571 (Or. 1982).
60 Id. (challenge came under OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 163.275 (1980)).
61 Id. (paraphrasing the challenged statute OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 163.275) (1980)).
62 Kent Greenawalt, Criminal Coercion and Freedom of Speech, 78 NW. U. L. REV. 1081, 1081 (1984)
(“Before Robertson, most courts had paid little attention to free speech problems with such statutes, assuming
that criminal coercion is not expression that is constitutionally protected.”).
63 Robertson, 649 P.2d at 589–90.
64 121 P.3d 613, 621 (Or. 2005) (emphasis added) (citing Robertson, 649 P.2d at 579).
65 Robertson, 649 P.2d at 575 (quoting State v. Blocker, 630 P.2d 824, 827 (1981)). The court in
Robertson defined overbreadth in detail and explained why an overbreadth challenge differs from a vagueness
challenge:
57
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Supreme Court’s overbreadth doctrine, the Robertson court explained that its
goal in performing the overbreadth analysis was to determine whether the
challenged statute “appears to reach privileged communication or whether it
can be interpreted to avoid such ‘overbreadth.’”66
The court then designed a multi-step analysis to determine whether a
challenged statute is, in fact, overbroad, and whether it can be judicially
“saved.”67 This Robertson analysis has become a focal point of the Oregonian
overbreadth analysis.68 Cases post-Robertson have slightly modified and
clarified the original framework.69 This Comment relies on that revised
Robertson framework.
2. Steps in the Robertson Framework
In a current Robertson analysis, a court basically follows three steps to
determine a statute’s fate.70 First, the court places the statute into one of three
categories to determine whether it targets the actual content of speech, or,
instead, the effects of speech.71 If it targets the content of speech, a separate
analysis is performed.72 However, if it does not, the analysis continues to step
two, where the court must determine whether the law “exceed[s] constitutional
boundaries, purporting to reach conduct protected by . . . Article I, section 8.”73

An “overbroad” law . . . is not vague, or need not be. Its vice is not failure to communicate . . .
For a law is overbroad to the extent that it announces a prohibition that reaches conduct which
may be not prohibited. A legislature can make a law as “broad” and inclusive as it chooses unless
it reaches into constitutionally protected ground.
Id. at 575.
66 Id. at 579. Privileged communication refers to that protected by OR. CONST. art. I, § 8 (codifying the
freedom of speech in the Oregon Bill of Rights).
67 Id. at 587–88.
68 See, e.g., Rex Armstrong, State Court Federalism, 30 VAL. U. L. REV. 493, 500 (1996).
69 The creation of categories, for example, was a significant clarifying change to Robertson. See State v.
Babson 326 P.3d 559, 566 (Or. 2014) (en banc); State v. Plowman, 838 P.2d 558, 562–63 (Or. 1992) (en
banc), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 974 (1993). Additionally, subsequent decisions have modified the historical
exception portion of Robertson. See, e.g., State v. Stoneman, 920 P.2d 535, 539–40 (Or. 1996); infra notes
229–30 and accompanying text.
70 See Plowman, 838 P.2d at 564.
71 See infra note 75.
72 See Babson, 326 P.3d at 567 (“A law that is ‘written in terms directed to the substance of any
“opinion” or any “subject” of communication’ is unconstitutional unless the restriction is wholly confined
within an historical exception.”).
73 Id. at 570 (quoting State v. Robertson, 649 P.2d 569, 575 (Or. 1982)).
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Finally, if a court finds the challenged statute to be overbroad, it must
“determine whether it can be interpreted to avoid such overbreadth.”74
Each step of the analysis requires a court’s interpretation. In the first step of
a Robertson analysis, a court first places the potentially overbroad statute into
one of three categories: (1) statutes directed to the substance of an opinion or
subject communication; (2) statutes focusing on the forbidden effects of
speech; and (3) statutes focusing on the forbidden effects of acts that do not
target expression.75
If the statute is directed toward the substance of protected speech,76 for
example by prohibiting the expressing of an opinion, it fits within category
one.77 After making that finding, a court conducts a historical exception
analysis.78 This analysis is part of Robertson’s first step, and only applies to
statutes that fall into this first category.79 The historical exception test provides
that when a law is directed toward “the substance of any opinion or any subject
of communication,” it is facially unconstitutional “unless the scope of the
restraint is wholly confined within some historical exception that was
well-established” when either the First Amendment or the 1859 Oregon
Constitution was written.80 The Robertson opinion listed numerous crimes as

74

Id.
Although the Robertson court did not explicitly define these categories, the analysis has been clarified
and developed by the Oregon Supreme Court in the years following the decision to incorporate this categorical
approach. See Babson, 326 P.3d at 566; Plowman, 838 P.2d at 562–63; see also Michael West, High Court
Study, Arrested Development: An Analysis of the Oregon Supreme Court’s Free Speech Jurisprudence in the
Post-Linde Years, 63 ALB. L. REV. 1237, 1252–53 (2000) (explaining the requirements for each of the three
categories). “[W]hen presented with a statute challenged as ‘overbroad,’ or infringing upon a constitutionally
protected speech, a court is to first carefully assess the true nature of the measure.” Id. at 1252.
76 See State v. Robertson, 649 P.2d 569, 576 (Or. 1982) (explaining that a statute legislates against
speech when “the constitutional guarantee invoked against the statute forbade its very enactment as drafted”).
The Oregon Court also explained that because the free speech provision of the Oregon Constitution prohibits
passing a law “restraining the free expression of opinion,” a law “written in terms directed to the substance of
any ‘opinion’” would fall into category one. See id. (emphasis added) (citing Wheeler v. Green, 593 P2.d 777
(Or. 1979)).
77 See Babson, 326 P.3d at 566.
78 See West, supra note 75, at 1252; William R. Long, Note, Requiem for Robertson: The Life and Death
of a Free-Speech Framework in Oregon, 34 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 101, 109 (1998) (relying on the original
formulation of Robertson, as opposed to how it has evolved today, which treats the historical exception
analysis as part of step one).
79 See West, supra note 75, at 1252; Long, supra note 78, at 109.
80 William R. Long, Free Speech in Oregon: A Framework Under Fire, OR. ST. B. BULL. (Oct. 2003),
https://www.osbar.org/publications/bulletin/03oct/free.html (citing Robertson, 649 P.2d at 576); see
Robertson, 649 P.2d at 576; West, supra note 75, at 1252; Long, supra note 78, at 109 (“Under the ‘historical
exception,’ a law that is directed to the substance of any opinion or subject of communication is
75
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examples of such historical exceptions: “perjury, forgery, solicitation or verbal
assistance in crime, some forms of theft, forgery and fraud.”81 If the law does
not fit into one of these historical exceptions and facially targets protected
speech, it is per se unconstitutional.82
If the court determines in step one that a statute does not prohibit content,
the court will place it into the second or third category.83 These categories
focus on statutes targeting forbidden effects of speech and conduct, as opposed
to statutes prohibiting the actual content of words or actions.84 The second
category focuses on the operational capacity of language; it is not the content
of the language that the challenged statute criminalizes, but instead the effect
that language has on another individual.85 The language criminalized in the
second category is that which operationalizes the speaker’s criminal intent,
whereas statutes in the first category prohibit the content of the actual speech.86
For example, the challenged statute in Robertson criminalized the act of
expressing words that would result in another person feeling threatened—that
is, it criminalized the effect of that speech, not the content.87
Finally, the third category encompasses statutes that prohibit the effect that
certain conduct, such as a gesture, has on others.88 Unlike a statute in category
two, a category three statute is one in which the “proscribed means of

unconstitutional, unless the law existed at the time of the First Amendment (1791) and at the time of the
Oregon Constitution (1859), and was not eliminated by either.”).
81 See Robertson, 649 P.2d at 576.
82 See id. (“If a law concerning free speech on its face violates [the prohibition of enacting laws
restraining the free expression of opinion], it is unconstitutional” (quoting State v. Spencer, 611 P.2d 1147,
1148 (Or. 1980))). See generally Powell’s Books, Inc. v. Kroger, 622 F.3d 1202, 1211 n.12 (9th Cir. 2010)
(explaining how the first prong of Robertson (effects versus content inquiry plus historical inquiry) operates:
“If the law targets content, it is unconstitutional unless the restraint is confined within some historical
exception”).
83 See State v. Plowman, 838 P.2d 558, 562–63 (Or. 1992) (en banc) (“Laws . . . which focus on
forbidden results[] can be divided further into two categories.”).
84 See id.
85 See id.
86 See id.
87 See Robertson, 649 P.2d at 579.
88 See Plowman, 838 P.2d at 563 (noting it applies to a “[a] person accused of causing such [forbidden]
effects by language or gestures . . .” (alterations in original) (quoting Robertson, 649 P.2d at 579)). Category
three encompasses laws that prohibit actions that would not constitute expressive conduct under the First
Amendment. See Robertson, 649 P.2d at 579 n.11 (using Supreme Court precedent, United States v. O’Brien,
391 U.S. 367 (1968), involving a “prosecution for destroying a draft registration certificate burned in political
protest,” as an example of a law that prohibited forbidden effects but did not implicate free speech claims).
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causing . . . [forbidden] effects” in the statute does not include protected
expression.89
After completing this first step of its analysis, the court proceeds to the
second stage: for category one statutes surviving a historical analysis or those
in the second or third category, it conducts an “overbreadth and narrowing
inquiry.”90 This inquiry mirrors the Supreme Court’s overbreadth doctrine by
determining whether the statute broadly infringes upon “constitutionally
permissible limits.”91
In this second stage of its analysis of the statute used to prosecute the
defendant in Robertson, the court determined that by prohibiting the act of
making a threat, the challenged statute forbade an effect of speech92 (thus
placing it in category two), and then analyzed whether the statute infringed
significantly upon privileged communication.93 The court found that the
Oregon coercion statute “require[d] neither the conduct demanded of the
victim nor the action threatened in case of refusal to be wrongful.”94 Most of
the “threatened consequences,” the court noted, were legal.95 Additionally, the
“target” of the coercion statute, “effective use of fear to induce compliance
with a demand,” was not illegal in itself.96 The court explained that the law
89 State v. Babson, 326 P. 3d 559, 566 (Or. 2014) (en banc) (“If the law focuses on forbidden effects, and
‘the proscribed means [of causing those effects] include speech or writing,’ . . . then the law is analyzed under
the second Robertson category. . . . If, on the other hand, the law focuses only on forbidden effects, then the
law is in the third Robertson category . . . .” (alterations in original)). Laws in the third category do not touch
protected First Amendment expression, so they are evaluated under an as-applied approach. Id.; see Robertson,
649 P.2d at 579 (“If that statute had been directed only against causing the forbidden effects, a person accused
of causing such effects by language or gestures would be left to assert . . . that the statute could not
constitutionally be applied to his particular words or other expression, not that it was drawn and enacted
contrary to article I, section 8.” (discussing State v. Spencer, 611 P.2d 1149, 1147 (Or. 1980))).
90 See Long, supra note 78, at 109–10. If a statute passes the first category’s historical exception analysis
or falls into categories two or three, the court has not declared the statute overbroad on its face—there is a
chance that the statute could be constitutional, whether on its face or through judicial narrowing, so the court
then completes an overbreadth analysis to determine if the statute is overbroad, and if so, whether it can be
saved. See id.
91 See Robertson, 649 P.2d at 577; Long, supra note 78, at 119 n.55 (explaining development of the
Supreme Court’s overbreadth doctrine).
92 Robertson, 649 P.2d at 579 (“the effect of frightening another person into a nonobligatory and
undesired course of conduct”). The court also distinguished the “threat” in Robertson versus the provision in a
previous case where the law specifically prohibited disorderly conduct “speech”: “[the coercion statute] is not
a law whose enactment was for this reason alone wholly withdrawn from legislative authority.” Id. at 577–79.
93 See id. at 580–81; West, supra note 75, at 1252–53.
94 See Robertson, 649 P.2d at 579.
95 See id. (“Only one item among the threatened consequences listed in ORS 163.275(1) assumes
illegality . . . .”).
96 Id. at 580.
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was therefore vastly overbroad, noting many hypothetical forms of
communication that the statute would prohibit.97
Finally, a court performing a Robertson analysis must determine whether it
is possible to judicially narrow the statute to save it from invalidation.98 In
Robertson, the court explained that because the statute was so broad and
inclusive, it touched privileged expression in a variety of public and private
settings.99 The court found the statute to be so vastly overbroad that the
legislative intent was unclear.100 It therefore determined that judicial narrowing
could not save the statute.101 Its analysis complete, the Robertson court
invalidated the statute, sending a mandate to the Oregon legislature to narrow
the statute.102
3. Robertson’s Development and Multi-State Adoption
In the years since Robertson, the most practical and significant principles of
the decision have persevered in Oregon overbreadth analyses and still provide
helpful guidance. For example, in 2014, the Oregon Supreme Court utilized a
Robertson analysis to address a free expression challenge in State v. Babson.103
Furthermore, despite critics’ laments that the Robertson framework has strayed

97

Id. (listing examples of conduct that the statute would prohibit, including one man threatening to tell
another’s wife about his affair if he did not stop sleeping with the first man’s wife; a person threatening to
disclose an airline pilot’s secret illness if he did not get medical attention; or a person threatening to share a
politician’s embarrassing past if he did not quit his campaign). The Robertson court relied on the lower court’s
dissent for some of the listed hypothetical situations. See State v. Robertson, 635 P.2d 1057, 1062 (Or. Ct.
App. 1981) (Warden, J., dissenting).
98 Robertson, 649 P.2d at 589–590.
99 Id. at 589 (explaining that the statute infringed upon speech in politics, journalism, academic life, and
between families). The Robertson court followed the Supreme Court’s overbreadth analysis for this step of its
framework. See Note, supra note 1, at 882–83.
100 Greenawalt, supra note 62, at 1089 (explaining that the Robertson court determined that in order to
save the statute, it would have to write in specific expansions, which would not only “trespass on . . .
legislative function[s],” but would also create an impermissibly vague statute).
101 See Robertson, 649 P.2d at 590 (“We cannot substitute a wider set of exclusions for those knowingly
chosen by the drafters of ORS 163.275, even assuming that such wider exclusions rather than narrower and
more precise affirmative coverage are the means to confine the statute within constitutional bounds.”).
102 See Planned Parenthood v. Am. Coal. of Life Activists, 945 F. Supp. 1355, 1381 (D. Or. 1996)
(“Subsequent to Robertson . . . the Oregon Legislature redrafted the statute in order to correct its
overbreadth. . . . [T]he current, redrafted version . . . passes constitutional muster provided that the ‘fear’
which is ‘instilled’ in the other person is objectively reasonable, the physical injury that is feared is objectively
reasonable, and the ‘some person’ to whom injury is threatened is some specific person.”).
103 326 P.3d 559, 566, 567 (Or. 2014) (en banc).
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too far from its original articulation,104 this Comment argues that the changes
implemented by Oregon courts over the years have actually clarified and
helped to preserve Robertson through the development of categories and the
narrowing of the historical exception.105 Such contributions have proven
advantageous for evaluating state overbreadth claims.106 While the framework
applied in Robertson has developed and changed over the past three decades, it
still serves as a guiding principle for Oregonian constitutional interpretation.107
Perhaps, more importantly, its message has echoed across the country in the
decades since its inception.108
Although the historical exception analysis test from category one has not
been adopted by other jurisdictions, other elements of Robertson have proven
useful to sister states.109 State courts have frequently focused on the second
step of Robertson: the constitutional overbreadth analysis.110
In its opinion addressing the constitutionality of a Seattle city coercion
ordinance, the Washington Court of Appeals quoted Robertson, emphasizing
that the overbreadth of the statute could potentially criminalize political,
journalistic, academic, and familiar speech.111 Drawing from Robertson’s
explanation on the same subject, the court declined to construe the statute in a
way that would implicitly read a criminal intent requirement into the statute,
and instead determined that the statute was too broad to be judicially
“saved.”112 A Hawaii court made a similar decision in Feinberg v. Butler,
adopting Robertson’s interpretation of the Supreme Court’s overbreadth
104 West, supra note 75, at 1283 (“The Robertson framework . . . was recast and arguably stripped of
much of its promise.”); Long, supra note 78, at 123 (arguing that the Plowman decision “completely
abandoned” the “traditional Robertson concern with patient comparative historical investigation into statutes”);
Long, supra note 80 (arguing that decisions such as Stoneman caused “cracks in the Robertson framework”).
105 State v. Stoneman, 920 P.2d 535, 540–41 (Or. 1996); State v. Plowman, 838 P.2d 558, 562–63 (Or.
1992) (en banc); cf. Long, supra note 78, at 133–36 (explaining that the decisions in the 1990s made the
historical analysis too rigid, and now, “trying to find a historical exception has become an exercise in trying to
find an exact historical prototype”).
106 Contra Long, supra note 78, at 123. See generally Babson, 326 P.3d at 566 (using a revised Robertson
framework); Stoneman, 920 P.2d at 540–41 (explaining how to use a revised historical analysis).
107 See, e.g., Babson, 326 P.3d at 566.
108 E.g., State v. Steiger, 781 P.2d 616, 621 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989); Whimbush v. People, 869 P.2d 1245,
1248 (Colo. 1994) (en banc); Feinberg v. Butler, No. 25255, 2004 WL 1822869, at *5 (Haw. Ct. App. Aug.
12, 2004) (unpublished disposition); People v. Feldman, 791 N.Y.S.2d 361, 383 n.15 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2005);
City of Seattle v. Ivan, 856 P.2d 1116, 1120–21 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993).
109 See supra note 108.
110 E.g., Ivan, 856 P.2d at 1120.
111 Id. at 1120–21 (citing State v. Robertson, 649 P.2d 569, 589 (Or. 1982)).
112 Id. at 1121, 1123.
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doctrine.113 Explaining that the challenged law was not sufficiently narrow so
as to avoid infringing upon a substantial range of protected expression, the
court invalidated the statute in question.114
The Colorado Supreme Court adopted Oregon’s categorical approach
(Robertson step one) to evaluate whether the challenged statute targeted the
content (category one) or the operationalizing of protected expression
(category two).115 In Whimbush v. People, the court held that verbal “threats to
take or initiate even unlawful violent action are not beyond [F]irst
[A]mendment protection by their content alone, divorced from any imminent
realization.”116 The Colorado court further explained that even a “specific
intent” requirement read into the statute could not save it, because the statute
would still criminalize a “substantial amount of protected activity.”117
Robertson has served as a viable and effective framework for state
overbreadth challenges, having guided both Oregonian courts118 and those in
other states for decades.119 In spite of modern re-interpretations and
implementations of Robertson, its holding and foundational framework
continue to stand for and support the Oregon court’s belief that legislators, in
drafting statutes, should “focus on ‘the harms they seek to prevent rather than
simply attempting to prohibit certain kinds of speech.’”120
II. THE GROWTH OF PROSECUTORIAL CHARGING POWER
Overbroad coercion statutes on their own pose a significant danger to
protected communication,121 but they become particularly problematic when
combined with unbridled prosecutorial charging power. Because these statutes
113 2004 WL 1822869, at *5 (“[I]f the statutory language chosen by the legislature is broad enough to
reach constitutionally protected speech, the statute may be invalidated as overbroad.”).
114 Id. at *6 (noting the statute “does not require that the prohibited disparaging allegations actually cause
any harm”). The statute’s “language reaches beyond unprotected speech . . . to prohibit constitutionally
protected speech.” Id.
115 Whimbush v. People, 869 P.2d 1245, 1250 (Colo. 1994) (en banc).
116 Id. (quoting State v. Robertson, 649 P.2d 569, 580–81 (Or. 1982)).
117 Id. at 1248 (discussing COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-3-207(1) (West 1986)).
118 E.g., State v. Babson, 326 P.3d 559, 566 (Or. 2014) (en banc); State v. Ciancanelli, 121 P.3d 613, 621
(Or. 2005).
119 E.g., State v. Steiger, 781 P.2d 616, 621 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989); Whimbush v. People, 869 P.2d 1245,
1248 (Colo. 1994) (en banc); Feinberg v. Butler, No. 25255, 2004 WL 1822869, at *5 (Haw. Ct. App. Aug.
12, 2004) (unpublished disposition); People v. Feldman, 791 N.Y.S.2d 361, 383 n.15 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2005);
City of Seattle v. Ivan, 856 P.2d 1116, 1120 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993).
120 West, supra note 75, at 1238 (quoting Long, supra note 78, at 105).
121 Note, supra note 1, at 858–59.
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are so broad that they can criminalize a wide range of communication and
activity, prosecutors with unlimited discretion can pick and choose whom to
indict for alleged violations.122 The recent growth of prosecutorial charging
power has sparked a wave of criticism by legal academia, and in the last
twenty years there has been a proliferation of scholarship focused on this
concern.123 This Part first examines the difficulty faced by other branches of
government in attempting to control prosecutors or to limit their power to bring
charges against individuals. It then demonstrates how prosecutors are able to
use overbroad statutes as a strategic tool to indict politicians and government
actors without fearing the possibility of a “check” from other branches of
government.
The growth of prosecutorial power in the United States in the last
quarter-century, in the opinion of Professor Bennett Gershman, has been the
result of the “transition from a due process-oriented criminal justice model to a
model that has placed increasing emphasis on crime control.”124 Alternately,
Federal Judge Gerard E. Lynch argued that the expansion of prosecutorial
power is a result of rising costs and inefficiency in the judicial system.125
Whatever the reason for the growth in power over the years, prosecutors now
perhaps have more “unreviewable power and discretion” than any other
government official in America.126
A. The Bases of Strength for Prosecutorial Power & Discretion
Charging decisions constitute a particularly significant element of
prosecutorial power.127 Prosecutors have discretion to determine whether to
bring charges against a defendant and what those charges will be.128 These
charges then determine “the extent of the suspect’s contact with the criminal
122

See infra notes 139–41 and accompanying text (discussing prosecutorial charging immunity).
E.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons from
Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869 (2009); Stephanos Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation Versus
Prosecutorial Accountability, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 959 (2009); Bennett L. Gershman, The New Prosecutors,
53 U. PITT. L. REV. 393 (1992); Susan R. Klein, Enhancing the Judicial Role in Criminal Plea and Sentence
Bargaining, 84 TEX. L. REV. 2023 (2006); Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice,
66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2117 (1998).
124 Gershman, supra note 123, at 393.
125 Lynch, supra note 123, at 2142.
126 Bibas, supra note 123, at 960 (“Legislators are checked by other legislators, the executive’s veto,
judicial review, and voters. Governors and the President are limited by legislation, . . . judicial review, and
voters. Judges face appellate review . . . . Administrative agencies are constrained by judicial review.”).
127 James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1521, 1524–25 (1981).
128 Id. at 1525.
123
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justice system,” and what kind of bargain the prosecutor can later offer that
defendant.129
1. The Importance of the Charging Power
Professor Rachel Barkow addressed the power inherent in prosecutorial
charging decisions.130 She argued that broad statutes give prosecutors a sense
of legislative power through charging decisions because
Congress won’t make law with sufficient specificity to resolve
important issues of policy, and judges can’t . . . remedy this
inattention with lawmaking of their own. This lawmaking gap is . . .
filled by . . . Attorneys . . . who do effectively make law by adapting
[broad or vague] statutes to advance their own political interests.131

Moreover, when a prosecutor charges a defendant, he or she then holds a
significant amount of leverage over that defendant.132 The Supreme Court
implicitly championed that charging leverage, and in doing so, ushered in a
new era of prosecutorial power with its 1978 decision in Bordenkircher v.
Hayes.133 In Bordenkircher, the Court explained that plea bargaining derives
from “‘the mutuality of advantage’ to defendants and prosecutors.”134
Unfortunately, however, this approach to plea bargaining may have been
overly optimistic; some scholars have suggested that Bordenkircher actually
stands for the legalization of prosecutorial threats through plea bargains.135
Essentially, Bordenkircher has allowed prosecutors to legally threaten to add
charges and to give harsher treatment to a defendant who refuses to plea,
thereby rendering plea offers “almost irresistible” to most defendants.136
129

Id. at 1525–26.
Barkow, supra note 123, at 871 & n.9.
131 Id. (quoting Dan M. Kahan, Reallocating Interpretive Criminal-Lawmaking Power Within the
Executive Branch, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 47, 49 (1998)); see also Joan Erskine, If It Quacks Like a
Duck: Recharacterizing Domestic Violence as Criminal Coercion, 65 BROOK. L. REV. 1207, 1220, 1232
(1999) (arguing that broad coercion statutes could allow prosecutors to use felony charges of coercion to
transform misdemeanor domestic violence prosecutions into felonies and therefore gain more significant
domestic violence sentences in order to enhance punishment for domestic violence assailants).
132 See Barkow, supra note 123, at 881; Vorenberg, supra note 127, at 1525.
133 434 U.S. 357 (1978); see Barkow, supra note 123, at 879.
134 Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 363 (quoting Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 (1970)).
135 See, e.g., Klein, supra note 123, at 2036–37 (“Prosecutors can threaten to add additional felony
charges if a defendant refuses to plea, so long as this threat is made during . . . plea negotiations.”).
136 Vorenberg, supra note 127, at 1535; see also Barkow, supra note 123, at 879 (“After Bordenkircher,
‘[p]rosecutors have a strong incentive to threaten charges that are excessive.’” (alteration in original) (quoting
William J. Stuntz, Bordenkircher v. Hayes: The Rise of Plea Bargaining and the Decline of the Rule of Law 26
(Harvard Law Sch. Pub. Law Working Paper No. 120, 2005))); Klein, supra note 123, at 2036 (“[T]he Court
130
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2. Lack of Checks on Prosecutors
Not only are prosecutors legally imbued with this significant charging
power, but they also face few meaningful checks from agencies, judges,
legislatures, or even the public.137 Prosecutors are not forced to participate in
the same type of public disclosure mandated for legislatures and agencies.138
Their charging decisions are also protected by judicially crafted prosecutorial
immunity.139 Adopted from the common law by the Court in Imbler v.
Pachtman, prosecutorial immunity was designed to serve the public interest by
preserving prosecutors’ independence.140 Addressing policy concerns
underlying the development of this immunity, the Court maintained that
forcing prosecutors to face harassment or legal repercussions from their
charging decisions would “prevent the vigorous and fearless performance of
the prosecutor’s duty that is essential to the proper functioning of the criminal
justice system.”141
Prosecutors generally face few meaningful judicial checks on their
charging choices.142 In fact, where judicial standards governing prosecutors do
exist, they are rarely utilized to control charging decisions.143 In Berger v.
United States, the Supreme Court explained that while a prosecutor may
has consistently refused to place any meaningful constitutional limits on the threats a prosecutor can make to
compel a plea deal.”).
137 Bibas, supra note 123, at 959, 961; Vorenberg, supra note 127, at 1554–55.
138 Bibas, supra note 123, at 961; Vorenberg, supra note 127, at 1554–55. Although district attorneys are
in some ways accountable because they are elected officials, assistant district attorneys do not have this
responsibility. Additionally, even though district attorneys are elected officials, they are not subject to the
same types of disclosure requirements as, for instance, legislators. Bibas, supra note 123, at 961.
139 See Gershman, supra note 123, at 406.
140 424 U.S. 409, 427 (1976); Bibas, supra note 123, at 974.
141 Imbler, 424 U.S. at 427–28. The Court made this decision fully realizing that “genuinely wronged
defendant[s]” would be without redress, but in balancing the defendant’s position versus the government’s
interest in an independent prosecutor, it held in favor of prosecutorial immunity. Id.
142 Along with the equal protection analysis described in the following paragraph, there are also some
court-crafted limits on “prosecutorial vindictiveness.” Robert L. Misner, Recasting Prosecutorial Discretion,
86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 717, 746–47 (1996) (“Only in very limited circumstances, such as race
discrimination or vindictiveness, will the court overturn a prosecutor’s charging decision.” (footnotes
omitted)). Vindictiveness is “a term of art used to denote constitutionally prohibited retaliatory uses of the
state’s power to enhance the defendant’s punishment.” Barbara A. Schwartz, The Limits of Prosecutorial
Vindictiveness, 69 IOWA L. REV. 127, 128 (1983). However, vindictiveness claims in the charging and
pleading stage only arise when a defendant “first exercises or threatens to exercise a procedural right.” Murray
R. Garnick, Note, Two Models of Prosecutorial Vindictiveness, 17 GA. L. REV. 467, 475 (1983). This
Comment focuses on prosecutorial discretion to bring initial charges against a defendant in a politically
motivated prosecution, and vindictiveness is not an applicable control for prosecutorial charging decisions in
this context.
143 Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935); Vorenberg, supra note 127, at 1539.
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“prosecute with earnestness and vigor,” he or she “is not at liberty to strike foul
[blows].”144 He or she may not, the Court explained, use “improper methods
calculated to produce a wrongful conviction.”145 While this limitation seems
like a reasonable and appropriate guideline for prosecutors, it is worth noting
that the leading case on invalidating an indictment under an equal protection
analysis was decided in 1886 in Yick Wo v. Hopkins.146 Yick Wo prohibits
prosecutors from prosecuting individuals based solely on a “constitutionally
impermissible criterion” such as “race, sex, or exercise of [F]irst [A]mendment
rights,”147 but this case was the “first and last time the . . . Court struck down a
prosecution for the invalid selection of a target.”148 Additionally, although
criminal prosecution based on a prosecutor’s improper motives is illegal, it is
almost impossible to prove a prosecutor’s state of mind in bringing charges.149
B. Current Solutions to Prosecutorial Power, and Why They Are Largely
Ineffective
Academics have posed possible solutions to the problem of excessive
prosecutorial power, but none are particularly effective in practice. For
example, legislatures might exert checks on prosecutors from above, perhaps
by creating a law directly limiting prosecutorial power in plea bargaining,
implementing sentencing commissions, or narrowing sentencing ranges to
“reallocate powers now monopolized by prosecutors.”150 This strict legislative
control, is impractical, however, because legislatures have “strong incentives”
to remain on the same “side” as prosecutors by maximizing convictions and
minimizing costs in the criminal system.151 Legislatures “do not want to be
accused of reducing the number of crimes on the books.”152 This natural
alliance between the legislative and executive branches (prosecutors represent

144

295 U.S. at 88.
Id.
146 Vorenberg, supra note 127, at 1539 (citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886)).
147 Id. at 1540.
148 Id.
149 See id. at 1542 (“Rarely will a prosecutor explicitly signal improper motives.”).
150 Id. at 1568 (suggesting a “reassertion of legislative authority over policymaking on crime and
punishment”).
151 Bibas, supra note 123, at 966; see also Dripps, supra note 6, at 1166.
152 Bibas, supra note 123, at 967.
145
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“the State”) makes it unlikely that legislatures will choose to cut prosecutorial
power through direct overhead regulation.153
Judicial oversight is perhaps equally ineffective for controlling
prosecutorial charging decisions.154 Multiple authors have argued that judicial
deference to legislatures also prevents judiciaries from controlling
prosecutors.155 Legislatures “tend to overcriminalize,” for example by creating
multiple laws that prohibit the same behavior.156 Judges, in turn, defer to penal
codes,157 implicitly giving prosecutors the power to indiscriminately enforce
them. Moreover, due to legislative over-criminalization, “justifications for
punishment are so conflicting and indeterminate” that a “clever prosecutor”
could easily argue for a variety of possible charges or dispositions “within a
very broad ballpark.”158
Other academics writing on this topic have suggested that state prosecution
offices should self-regulate through such means as internal hiring guidelines,
increased education for new attorneys, and increased power from the lead
attorneys in an office.159 However, these policies would not serve as binding
law on prosecutors,160 and currently existing policies are often too general to
significantly limit prosecutors’ actions.161 More significantly, these proposals
are limited by human nature; although self-imposed limits are an optimistic
goal, “people rarely give up power voluntarily, and thus the capacity of
self-regulation . . . is limited.”162

153 Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, The Black Box, 94 IOWA L. REV. 125, 128–29 (2008)
(“[L]egislators . . . have never answered the calls for external regulation of the prosecutor’s office, and the
political dynamics of American criminal justice make it very unlikely that they will do so in the future.”).
154 See, e.g., id. at 128 (“[S]cholars have called for judges to review prosecutorial charging . . . decisions,
in the hope that judges can limit and legitimize the choices that prosecutors make. The judicial-oversight
project, however, has failed.”).
155 See, e.g., Roy B. Flemming, The Political Styles and Organizational Strategies of American
Prosecutors: Examples from Nine Courthouse Communities, 12 LAW & POL’Y 25, 26 (1990); Erik Luna,
Principled Enforcement of Penal Codes, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 515, 522 (2000).
156 Luna, supra note 155, at 522.
157 Id. (“The problem for police and prosecutors, then, is how to enforce a repetitive, unwieldy, and
sometimes unjustifiable list of prohibited conduct.”).
158 Bibas, supra note 123, at 974.
159 See, e.g., Bibas, supra note 123, at 1016; Erik Luna & Marianne Wade, Prosecutors as Judges, 67
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1413, 1466 (2010); Miller & Wright, supra note 153, at 161.
160 Luna & Wade, supra note 159, at 1419.
161 Id.
162 Vorenberg, supra note 127, at 1545.
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“Experience . . . is telling: It has proven almost impossible to convince
judges or legislatures to create meaningful limits on [prosecutorial
discretion].”163 External controls on prosecutors have not proven to be feasible
options for controlling prosecutorial charging decisions.164 Internal controls are
equally problematic—prosecution offices vary greatly across the country, and
prosecutors are unlikely to place vast and meaningful limits on their own
power.165 Therefore, given that prosecutors cannot be well controlled through
direct external or internal limits, this Comment argues that indirectly imposed
controls appear to be the best option. By narrowing the scope of statutes and
invalidating overbroad statutes, legislatures and judges can indirectly curb
prosecutors’ charging powers.
III. CASE STUDY: INDICTMENT OF FORMER TEXAS GOVERNOR RICK PERRY
In their overbreadth, coercion statutes provide a powerful tool for
prosecutors to use against political enemies without restraint. Professor James
Vorenberg, in his article on prosecutorial discretion, argued that “prosecutorial
decisions are susceptible to political influences.”166 Overbroad state coercion
statutes give prosecutors the ability to indict almost anyone for engaging in
many different forms of communication that ordinarily should qualify as
protected speech.
The August 2014 indictment of Governor Perry167 exemplifies the
particular danger posed by the combination of overbroad coercion statutes and
prosecutorial charging discretion. This section presents the Governor Perry
case study as a means of demonstrating how prosecutors can use overbroad
coercion statutes against politicians.
The saga began with the April 12, 2013 arrest of Travis County District
Attorney, Democrat Rosemary Lehmberg.168 Ms. Lehmberg was arrested for
DWI.169 She had a blood alcohol content of 0.23%, nearly three times the legal

163 Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, The Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, 55 STAN. L. REV. 29, 53 (2002);
see also Barkow, supra note 123, at 869, 913 n.220.
164 See supra notes 155–58 and accompanying text.
165 Barkow, supra note 123, at 883.
166 Vorenberg, supra note 127, at 1558 (“One must worry that political influences will enter into the
decisions prosecutors make and that they may deal harshly or gently with particular individuals for political
reasons.”).
167 Timeline: The Rick Perry Indictment, supra note 10.
168 Id.
169 Id.
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limit, and acted belligerently toward officers and jail personnel.170 Although
she pled guilty to the charge and served a forty-five day jail sentence, she did
not resign from her position despite Governor Perry’s requests.171
Since 1982, the Travis County District Attorney’s Office (generally a
Democratically controlled office) has received significant state funding to
manage the “Public Integrity Unit” (PIU), a prosecution unit designed to
investigate and prosecute corruption by political officials across the state.172 In
June 2013, Governor Perry threatened Ms. Lehmberg that he would veto over
eight million dollars apportioned by the legislature for the PIU if she did not
resign.173 Ms. Lehmberg still refused to resign, however, and Perry used his
line-item veto to prevent the designated appropriation from going to the
PIU.174 Although his veto did not completely terminate the PIU’s existence, the
unit was forced to lay off, reassign, or give early retirement to twenty
individuals.175 Therefore, the veto strictly limited the PIU’s ability to
investigate and prosecute new cases.176
Perry was in no way secretive about his intention to veto the bill, or his
reasons for eventually doing so.177 In his official statement after issuing the
veto in June 2013, he declared that he could not “in good conscience support
continued State funding for an office with statewide jurisdiction at a time when

170 Mark Pulliam, The Rick Perry Indictment Is Textbook Malicious Prosecution, FEDERALIST (Aug. 18,
2014), http://thefederalist.com/2014/08/18/the-rick-perry-indictment-is-textbook-malicious-prosecution/.
171 Id.
172 Id. This unit is headed by the Travis County DA. Id.
173 Olivia Nuzzi, What the Hell Just Happened in Texas, and Why Was Rick Perry Just Indicted?, DAILY
BEAST (Aug. 15, 2014, 10:05 PM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/08/15/what-the-hell-justhappened-in-texas-and-why-was-rick-perry-just-indicted.html.
174 OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR RICK PERRY, PROCLAMATION BY THE GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF TEXAS
(2013)., http://www.lrl.state.tx.us/scanned/vetoes/83/sb1.pdf (outlining the Line-Item Vetoes in S.B. No. 1,
Art. IV, D.1.4). The implications of this veto on Texas’s political climate were significant: most elected
politicians in Texas are Republicans, and therefore most of the investigations done by the Democrat-controlled
PIU would no longer be possible. Nuzzi, supra note 173 (“One of the few positions in control of a Democrat
under Perry’s watch would’ve vanished—a big deal, given the power of the Public Integrity Unit.”).
175 Patrick Caldwell, Rick Perry Was Just Indicted in Texas. Here’s Why, MOTHER JONES (Aug. 15, 2014,
6:00 AM), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/04/rick-perry-texas-grand-jury-investigation-publicintegrity.
176 Id.
177 Suzanne Garment, Perry’s Indictment: Crime and Punishment, Texas-Style, REUTERS (Aug. 27, 2014),
http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2014/08/27/perrys-indictment-crime-and-punishment-texas-style/.
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the person charged with ultimate responsibility of that unit [Lehmberg] has lost
the public’s confidence.”178
Days after Perry’s veto, a liberal Texas group, Texans for Public Justice,
filed a formal complaint against Perry for threatening to veto funding for the
PIU and for abusing the powers of his office by exercising that veto.179 The
Travis County District Attorney’s Office (under Lehmberg) originally started
the investigation against Perry, but it recused itself in August 2013 and
appointed former federal prosecutor Michael McCrum as a special
prosecutor.180 A year later, Perry was indicted by a Travis County Grand Jury
on two felony counts: abuse of official power and coercion of a public
servant.181
The indictments were met with a major media response.182 Conservatives183
and some liberals184 rushed to Perry’s defense, including one author who
accused the prosecutors of using a “frivolous indictment . . . as a political
178

OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR RICK PERRY, supra note 174; see also Garment, supra note 177 (“It must
have seemed like a safe move for Perry to demand Lehmberg’s resignation: surely the public would recoil
from seeing Lehmberg’s misbehavior in the pixelly flesh.”).
179 Timeline: The Rick Perry Indictment, supra note 10. This Comment addresses the second accusation in
the indictment: threatening to veto funding.
180 Id.
181 E.g., Pulliam, supra note 170; Timeline: The Rick Perry Indictment, supra note 10. It is worth nothing
that these are extremely powerful and substantial charges, especially when combined. If convicted on both
charges, Perry could have technically faced over ninety-nine years in jail. The second count of the indictment,
and the subject of this Comment, is charged under TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 36.03. Under that statute, Perry’s
actions constitute a “felony of the third degree” because the “threatened action,” (making the veto), was a
first-degree felony according to the first count of the indictment. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 36.03, 39.02(c)(7)
(West 2011). That first-degree felony carries with it a potential punishment of “not more than 99 years or less
than 5 years” of imprisonment. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.32 (West 2011). Had only the second count of the
indictment gone forward, Perry would have still potentially faced up to ten years in jail. TEX. PENAL CODE
ANN. § 12.34 (West 2011) (“An individual adjudged guilty of a felony of the third degree shall be punished by
imprisonment . . . for any term of not more than ten years or less than two years.”). As a comparison, a violent
domestic assault involving strangulation or choking of a victim is also a “felony of the third degree,” and
would therefore carry the same potential punishment. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.01(b)(2)(B) (West 2011).
182 E.g., Pat Nolan, Rick Perry’s Indictment Should Scare All Americans, AM. SPECTATOR (Sept. 5, 2014),
http://spectator.org/articles/60347/rick-perrys-indictment-should-scare-all-americans; Eric Pianin, Trumped Up
or Not, Rick Perry’s Indictment Could Derail Him, FISCAL TIMES (Aug. 26, 2014), http://www.thefiscaltimes.
com/Articles/2014/08/26/Trumped-or-Not-Rick-Perry-s-Indictment-Could-Derail-Him; Paul J. Weber & Will
Weissert, Rick Perry Indicted!, SALON (Aug. 15, 2014, 7:30 PM), http://www.salon.com/2014/08/15/rick_
perry_indicted/.
183 E.g., Pulliam, supra note 170.
184 See, e.g., Editorial, Is Gov. Rick Perry’s Bad Judgment Really a Crime?, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 18, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/19/opinion/is-gov-perrys-bad-judgment-really-a-crime.html; see also Colin
Campbell, Even Liberals Think the Indictment of Rick Perry Looks Weak, BUSINESS INSIDER (Aug. 16, 2014,
9:12 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/liberals-criticize-rick-perry-indictment-2014-8.
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weapon.”185 Another complained that “prosecutors have too much
imagination,”186 described Perry as a victim of vicious prosecution, and
warned, “If a popular sitting governor can be indicted on such a flimsy basis,
then every one of us is vulnerable.”187 Perry ultimately pled not guilty, but his
first set of motions to dismiss the case (based on claims about the swearing in
of the special prosecutor and the filing of certain paperwork) was denied on
November 18, 2014.188
In the context of this Comment,189 the second charge, coercion of a public
official under Texas Penal Code § 36.03,190 is particularly troubling because it
shows how a prosecutor can begin an investigation under an overbroad
coercion statute. The Texas Court of Appeals previously grappled with an
indictment under an earlier incantation of this statute in State v. Hanson.191 In
Hanson, the court found the 1989 version of Texas Penal Code § 36.03
unconstitutionally vague and therefore invalid.192 The court quashed the
indictments based on vagueness, but chose not to rule on overbreadth.193
While Hanson was being litigated, the Texas legislature amended the
language of the statute to change the definition of coercion under
§ 36.01(1)(F)—now codified under § 1.07(9))—to “a threat, however
communicated . . . to unlawfully take or withhold action as a public servant, or
to cause a public servant to unlawfully take or withhold action.”194 Four years
after the Hanson decision, however, the Texas legislature re-amended the

185

Pulliam, supra note 170.
Nolan, supra note 182.
187 Id.
188 E.g., Sara Fischer, Judge Rules He Won’t Dismiss Rick Perry Case over Paperwork Technicality, CNN
(Nov. 19, 2014, 2:22 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/11/18/politics/rick-perry-case-texas/.
189 At the time of writing, the Court of Appeals had yet to hand down the decision on the second count of
the indictment. Ex parte James Richard “Rick” Perry, No. 03-15-00063-CR, 2015 WL 4514696 (Tex. Ct. App.
July 24, 2015) Although the Court of Appeals predictably ruled by adopting similar reasoning and the overall
conclusion that this Comment suggests, this Comment advocates a nationwide adoption of modified Robertson
in ruling on overbroad coercion statutes. Additionally, this Comment later argues for a legislative approach, in
the alternative to a judicial ruling, on these overbroad coercion statutes.
190 TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 36.03 (West 2011).
191 State v. Hanson, 793 S.W.2d 270 (Tex. App. 1990). In Hanson, a judge was charged under an earlier
version of the statute under which Perry is charged for allegedly threatening to terminate the funding for
salaries of a deputy district court and an assistant district attorney in an attempt to coerce another judge into
firing the county auditor and the attorney into revoking an individual’s probation. Id. at 271.
192 Id.
193 Id. at 273.
194 Id. (emphasis added). Compare TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07(9) (West 2011), with TEX. PENAL
CODE ANN. § 36.01(1)(F) (Vernon Supp. 1990).
186
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statute to remove the word “unlawfully.”195 The legislature’s deliberate
removal of “unlawfully” “implicitly mak[es] it clear . . . that threats of lawful
action as a public servant would indeed be a crime,” therefore leaving “the
statute . . . unconstitutionally overbroad.”196 That § 1.07(9) definition is
currently used in § 36.03(a)(1), which prohibits coercion of a public servant.197
It was under this revised overbroad statute that Governor Perry was charged.198
Therefore, under § 36.03 and § 1.07(9), it was the threat of the veto, rather
than the tangible act of vetoing the bill, that constituted Perry’s felonious
action for this particular charge.199 One former federal prosecutor, speaking
with CNN, illustrated the seemingly paradoxical nature of this charge: “[H]ow
can it be a crime to threaten to use a power that is entirely within the powers of
your office?”200
The Court of Appeals recognized the problematic nature the second count
of Perry’s indictment when it dismissed that count on July 24, 2015.201 The
court found the coercion statute facially unconstitutional because it was
unconstitutionally overbroad.202 The court recognized the problem of
potentially limitless applications of this statute,203 including potential threats to

195 Eugene Volokh, Is the Indictment of Texas Gov. Rick Perry Inconsistent with a Texas Court of Appeals
Precedent (as to the ‘Coercion’ Count)?, WASH. POST: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Aug. 16, 2014), http://www.
washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/08/16/is-the-indictment-of-texas-gov-rick-perryinconsistent-with-a-texas-court-of-appeals-precedent-as-to-the-coercion-count/.
196 Id.; see TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07(9) (West 2011).
197 TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 36.03(a)(1) (West 2011) (“A person commits an offense if by means of
coercion he: (1) influences or attempts to influence a public servant in a specific exercise of his official power
or a specific performance of his official duty . . . .”).
198 See Volokh, supra note 195.
199 See Drew Griffin, Scott Bronstein, & Mary Kay Mallonee, 4 Reasons Why Rick Perry’s Exercise of
Power Got Him in Trouble, CNN (Sept. 2, 2014, 10:46 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/09/02/politics/rickperry-indictment/.
200 Id. (quoting former federal prosecutor Jeffrey Toobin).
201 Ex parte James Richard “Rick” Perry, No. 03-15-00063-CR, 2015 WL 4514696, at *42 (Tex. Ct. App.
July 24, 2015).
202 See id. at *3, *42.
203 Id. at *26 (Perry gave examples of “a ‘virtually endless’ array of threats that are in the nature of
‘ordinary give and take’ between and among . . . public servants . . . .”).
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the judiciary’s independence.204 In its order, the court cited the earlier Hanson
decision and upheld that decision’s ruling on First Amendment speech.205
Before the Court of Appeals issued its order referencing Hanson, Professor
Eugene Volokh suggested that the court’s earlier failure to rule on overbreadth
in Hanson had come back to haunt Governor Perry: even before the
legislature’s multiple revisions and the Hanson decision, § 36.03 was likely
unconstitutionally overbroad.206 Had the Hanson court proceeded with an
overbreadth analysis, the legislature might have received the message about the
importance of narrowing overbroad coercion statutes—the statute would have
been invalidated, and the legislature therefore forced to revise it. Instead, the
Court of Appeals was forced to consider a similar issue to make a similar
ruling to once again protect First Amendment speech.207 Of course, the
legislature could have still returned the statute to its prior overbroad state,
thereby creating the statute under which Governor Perry was charged.208
However, going forward, the Governor Perry prosecution should show state
legislators across the country why they must create and maintain narrow
coercion statutes in their own states to protect not only Constitutional
guarantees, but also their own careers.209
This Comment should in no way be read as a defense of Governor Perry; it
is instead meant to serve as an advisory about the collision of two growing
legal problems. Though the Governor Perry prosecution has been accused of
being a Democrat-led political crusade,210 it arguably damages the Democratic
Party’s ability to function in a red state211 more than it could ever potentially
help it.212 The indictment was brought under an unconstitutional statute, and
204 Id. (“[I]t has occurred to the members of this panel that unless appellate court justices can shoehorn
themselves into subsection (c)’s exception, section 36.03(a)(1) would seemingly put at risk that time-honored
practice whereby one justice will seek changes to another justice’s draft majority opinion by threatening to
write a dissent exposing flaws in the other’s legal reasoning.”).
205 Id. at *37 (“[T]he foundation for these holdings was the same conclusion we reach here—section
36.03(a)(1) . . . impinges upon speech that the First Amendment protects.”).
206 Volokh, supra note 195; see TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 36.03 (Vernon Supp. 1990).
207 Ex parte James Richard “Rick” Perry, 2015 WL 4514696, at *37.
208 See supra notes 194–96 and accompanying text.
209 See infra notes 277–86 and accompanying text.
210 See Texas Chainsaw Prosecution: Criminalizing Politics Hits a New Low with the Rick Perry
Indictment, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 18, 2014, 2:42 PM), http://online.wsj.com/articles/texas-chainsaw-prosecution1408318131.
211 See, e.g., 2014 Texas Elections Overview, POLITICO (Dec. 17, 2014, 2:31 PM), http://www.politico.
com/2014-election/results/texas/.
212 Michael Lind, Rick Perry’s Indictment Is Bad for Democrats: A Texas Perspective, SALON (Aug. 18,
2014, 10:31 AM), http://www.salon.com/2014/08/18/rick_perrys_indictment_is_bad_for_democrats_a_texas_
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however one may feel about Governor Perry’s political viewpoints, this
prosecution violated his right to protected speech. The statute itself is
inherently problematic, and the Court of Appeals made the appropriate choice
to invalidate it.213
IV. ARGUMENT: WHY AND HOW TEXAS AND OTHER STATES SHOULD
INVALIDATE AND PREVENT OVERBROAD STATE COERCION STATUTES
As the Governor Perry indictment demonstrates, overbroad coercion
statutes pose a particular danger to political speech and bargaining. The Texas
Court of Appeals seized the opportunity to correct the legislature’s errors
through judicial invalidation of the statute, and in doing so, deprived state
prosecutors of some of their unchecked power. However, the court explicitly
focused on federal law, and declined to set state court precedent for addressing
overbroad speech-based statutes to be adopted by other states in the future.214
This Part proposes a better judicial and legislative solution for Texas based on
Oregon’s Robertson analysis. It argues that this framework should have been
used to evaluate Governor Perry’s case, and then explains how this solution
can be implemented by legislatures and judiciaries in other states to prevent
future collisions between overbroad coercion statutes and unchecked state
prosecutors.
A. A Proposed Solution: Applying a Modified Robertson Analysis to the Perry
Indictment
State judiciaries should not give prosecutors the opportunity to bring
charges under coercion statutes as overbroad as Texas Penal Code § 36.03.
Although the Texas Court of Appeals correctly ruled on the overbreadth issue
in the Perry indictment, this section proposes a more thorough solution to the
Governor Perry problem and statutes similar to the one applied in his case—a
solution that is capable of establishing concrete precedent. It then calls
legislatures to action to avoid these types of overbreadth challenges in the
future. It applies a modified Robertson-style overbreadth framework to the
Perry indictment with a specific emphasis on how to treat the historical
perspective/ (“Now the indictment of Texas Governor Rick Perry allows Republicans to change the
narrative . . . to ‘Look how liberal prosecutors are trying to bring down every Republican governor who is a
potential president!’”).
213 Ex parte James Richard “Rick” Perry, No. 03-15-00063-CR, 2015 WL 4514696, at *37 (Tex. Ct. App.
July 24, 2015).
214 Id. at 33.

ROSENWASSER GALLEYSPROOFS2

648

1/14/2016 2:37 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 65:619

exception, and explains how other states’ judiciaries can perform similar
analyses to invalidate overbroad coercion statutes.
Oregon courts use Robertson to address all types of First Amendment
claims.215 To argue that other states should universally adopt this approach for
any First Amendment challenge, however, would be unrealistic.216 Oregon has
only been able to maintain the framework as applied to any First Amendment
challenge though decades of careful and persistent judicial opinions, and,
arguably, by the consistent placement of Democratic and left-leaning
individuals on the Oregon Supreme Court.217 Robertson dramatically increased
Oregon’s First Amendment freedoms, as illustrated, for instance, by an
assertion that “[t]he Oregon Supreme Court has come closer to putting into
practice . . . the absolutist view of the First Amendment [free speech
protections] than any other institution in American life.”218 This left-leaning
approach219 likely would have no place in many conservative states, including
Governor Perry’s state of Texas.220
Therefore, broad adoption of Robertson by state courts should be limited to
analyzing coercion statutes only. The Supreme Court overbreadth doctrine,
though influencing and guiding the Robertson framework, does not give the
same level of specificity, categorization, and clarity to state coercion statute
overbreadth analysis.221 Robertson’s use of categories,222 for instance, offers
clearer guidance than the Supreme Court’s threshold requirement that the
challenged law be “substantially involved” in First Amendment interests, such
215 West, supra note 75, at 1239 (“[T]he Robertson ‘framework’ provides the methodology by which the
court assesses questions implicating article I, section 8 of the Oregon Constitution, the state’s free speech
clause.”).
216 See infra notes 217–20.
217 West, supra note 75, at 1241; see, e.g., Long, supra note 78, at 114 (“The clearest decisions that
establish and refine the Robertson framework are Garcias, Moyle, and State v. Henry.” (first citing State v.
Henry, 732 P.2d 9 (Or. 1987); then citing State v. Moyle, 705 P.2d 740 (Or. 1985); and then citing State v.
Garcias, 679 P.2d 1354 (Or. 1984))).
218 West, supra note 75, at 1239 (alterations in original).
219 See infra note 220 (providing an example of a conservative state refusing to embrace a broad
interpretation of free speech).
220 See Cam I, Inc. v. Louisville/Jefferson Cty. Metro Gov’t, 2007 Ky. App. LEXIS 370, at *17–18 (Ky.
Ct. App. Oct. 5, 2007), rev’d, Cam I, Inc. v. Louisville/Jefferson Cty. Metro Gov’t, 2008 Ky. LEXIS 86 (Ky.
Apr. 16, 2008) (“Historically, it is apparent that Kentucky does not openly embrace forms of expression that
some other states do. Although Appellants attempt to persuade the Court that Kentucky, like other states, has a
long history of openly embracing any and all expression without restriction . . . [this] theory is not legally
sound.”).
221 See supra Part I.A.
222 See supra notes 69–75 and accompanying text.
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that overbreadth would result in a “chilling effect.”223 The Robertson
categorical approach specifically evaluates the exact language of a law in
question instead of looking at the broader questions of law posed by the
Supreme Court.224 It asks how the language operates and forces courts to
closely analyze the text of a law to determine that law’s scope and potential
application.
Additionally, the Supreme Court evaluates overbreadth using the “area of
impact” test to determine how substantial the challenged conduct’s claim is to
First Amendment protection.225 Although Robertson rests on essentially the
same principle, it once again offers more specific guidance for state courts;
Robertson’s overbreadth inquiry focuses on the precise threats and
consequences in a statute and offers specific hypothetical scenarios to illustrate
the types of protected speech a statute technically prohibits.226
Robertson also presents a framework designed to evaluate an overbroad
coercion statute, something that the Supreme Court’s analyses cannot
specifically offer.227 The Robertson framework was developed from a
challenge to an overbroad coercion statute, and the decision forced the
legislature to re-write that statute to render it constitutionally acceptable.
Robertson’s analysis is clear, specific, and so far has been easily transmitted to
other states.228
1. Implementing Robertson’s Historical Analysis Nationwide
Of course, any argument in favor of a Robertson analysis does raise
concerns surrounding its controversial historical exception test. This historical
exception has proven inherently inflexible and rigid even for Oregon courts to
implement,229 and therefore, it is best that other states do not adopt it into their
constitutional jurisprudence. Additionally, it is unlikely that all states would

223

Note, supra note 1, at 859.
See supra notes 69–75 and accompanying text.
225 Note, supra note 1, at 860.
226 See supra notes 94–97 and accompanying text.
227 See, e.g., Plowman v. Oregon, 508 U.S. 974 (1993) (denying certiorari to an Oregon case evaluating
the constitutionality of a coercion statute).
228 E.g., Whimbush v. People, 869 P.2d 1245, 1248 (Colo. 1994) (en banc); Feinberg v. Butler, No.
25255, 2004 WL 1822869, at *5 (Haw. Ct. App. Aug. 12, 2004) (unpublished disposition); City of Seattle v.
Ivan, 856 P.2d 1116, 1120 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993).
229 Long, supra note 78, at 112–18.
224
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accept the historical exception analysis’s inherently liberal and expansive free
speech perspective.230
Despite the historical exception’s removal from this Comment’s proposed
framework, the Robertson analysis as applied in other states should retain the
Robertson categories.231 First of all, as the Colorado Supreme Court found in
Whimbush,232 courts are likely to determine that coercion statutes fall into the
second Robertson category because they operationalize the speech articulated
in the statute.233 As in Robertson, the words in coercion statutes create a threat,
and the creation and articulation of that threat is the prohibited behavior.234 It is
not the content of those words that is prohibited, but rather the act of
articulating words meant to instill fear in the listener that coercion statutes
proscribe (category two).235
That said, because coercion statutes are so focused on individuals’ speech,
some courts may find challenged coercion statutes fit better into category one
(statutes outlawing content, not effects of content).236 Should that occur, states
could rely on guidance from State v. Stoneman,237 an Oregon Supreme Court
case that vastly re-defined the Robertson category one analysis.
In Stoneman, courts were faced with a “criminal statute directed at the
producers, purveyors, and purchasers of visual reproductions of children
engaged in sexually explicit conduct.”238 The statute prohibited the
distribution, manufacture, and possession of pornography that depicted actual

230 See West, supra note 75, at 1241 (“[A]ppointments tend to reflect the political philosophy of the
appointing governor. All of Oregon’s governors since 1986 have been Democrats. Each of the five justices
appointed since then have also been registered Democrats.” (footnote omitted)); see also Cam I, Inc. v.
Louisville/Jefferson Cty. Metro Gov’t, 2007 Ky. App. LEXIS 370, at *17–18 (Ky. Ct. App. Oct. 5, 2007),
rev’d, Cam I, Inc. v. Louisville/Jefferson Cty. Metro Gov’t, 2008 Ky. LEXIS 86 (Ky. Apr. 16, 2008);
Armstrong, supra note 68, at 501. See generally Long, supra note 80 (arguing for the maintenance of the
historical exception because “we are probably not yet ready to dispense with the message that Robertson still
sends us: we Oregonians are a unique and exceptional people”).
231 See Plowman, 838 P.2d at 562–63.
232 Whimbush, 869 P.2d at 1250.
233 See Plowman, 838 P.2d at 563.
234 See State v. Robertson, 649 P.2d 569, 578 (Or. 1982); supra text accompanying note 87.
235 See Robertson, 649 P.2d at 578.
236 See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
237 920 P.2d 535 (Or. 1996).
238 Id. at 537.
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underage children engaged in real sexual acts.239 The court refused to extend
the broad First Amendment exception to protect this “communication.”240
The court held that although the statute prohibited the sexualized visual
materials of children and therefore appeared to fit in category one, it actually
belonged in category two because the statute “was concerned with harm to
children,” and therefore focused on the effects of the communication, rather
than the content.241 The Stoneman decision emphasized the importance of a
statute’s context: “a statute cannot be read in a vacuum,” and therefore “[a]n
examination of the context of a statute, as well as of its wording, is necessary
to an understanding of the policy that the legislative choice embodies.”242
Therefore, should a court analyzing a coercion statute be tempted instead to
focus on the content of a threat itself and thus consider placing the statute in
category one, the contextual analysis argument in Stoneman should steer the
statute into category two.243
2. The Court of Appeals’ Decision in Light of Robertson
Governor Perry’s defense team prudently raised a facial overbreadth
challenge to Texas Penal Code § 1.07(9)—defining coercion—and § 36.03—
the statute under which Governor Perry is charged—in a pretrial habeas
motion.244 The Court of Appeals responded to this challenge and correctly
decided to invalidate the statute.245 The Court of Appeals agreed that the
statute was not “narrowly drawn” to achieve state objectives, and that the
statute extended far beyond constitutionally permissible applications.246
Similar to the court in Robertson, the Texas Court of Appeals recognized that
overbroad coercion statutes could criminalize threats that “are considered to be
a commonplace and accepted—if not also constitutionally protected—
component of the day-to-day debate, bargaining, and give-and-take that is
characteristic of American governmental and political processes.”247
239

Id. at 537–38 (challenging OR. STAT. ANN. § 163.680 (1987) (repealed 1995)).
Id. at 539.
241 Id. at 541 (“With respect to this second category, we think it is clear that [the statute] was concerned
with harm to children.”).
242 Id. (“[I]t is that aspect of the films and photographs described . . . , i.e., their relationship to harm to
children, rather than their communicative substance, that sets them apart.”).
243 See id.
244 TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 1.07(9), 36.03(a)(1) (West 2011); Ex parte James Richard “Rick” Perry,
No. 03-15-00063-CR, 2015 WL 4514696, at *1–2 (Tex. Ct. App. July 24, 2015).
245 Ex parte James Richard “Rick” Perry, 2015 WL 4514696, at *42.
246 Id. at *35, 38.
247 Id. at *24.
240
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What is missing from the Court of Appeals’ order, however, is a statecentric analysis that could be used to guide other states toward invalidating
overbroad coercion statutes—this order instead shies away from establishing
state law precedent. The Court of Appeals chose to focus exclusively on
federal First Amendment law, instead of evaluating and ruling based on the
Texas equivalent to the First Amendment (unlike the Robertson court did with
Oregon law).248 The Court of Appeals squandered a significant opportunity to
guide state precedent on overbroad coercion statutes. It even implied the
necessity for this precedent near the end of its opinion:
Our reasoning . . . is also consistent with decisions from other
jurisdictions that have recognized threats to be protected by the First
Amendment . . . . Some of these courts have invalidated . . .
prohibitions against threats on overbreadth grounds. Still others have
resorted to narrowing constructions of threat prohibitions . . . .249

As the court recognized, states differ in their individual treatment of
coercion statutes. Had the Texas Court of Appeals instead chosen to create a
framework under which state coercion statutes could be evaluated, it could
have set a guiding precedent for other states to follow when invalidating
overbroad coercion statutes. This solution would show state legislatures that
drafting overbroad coercion statutes will result in a predictable outcome:
judicial invalidation.
Instead of following the Texas Court of Appeals path and looking only to
federal law, a court handling this matter should evaluate the law under
Robertson. It should first examine the language of the statute and determine its
target. In this particular statute, the language targets the action of making the
threat. Section 1.07(9)(F) of the Texas Penal Code (previously § 36.01(f))
defines coercion as “a threat, however communicated . . . to take or withhold
action as a public servant, or to cause a public servant to take or withhold
action,”250 and that definition is used in § 36.03(a)(1), which prohibits coercion
of a public servant.251

248 Id. at *14 (“[W]e will focus our analysis entirely on the First Amendment protection and
jurisprudence.”).
249 Id. at *37.
250 TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07(9)(F) (West 2011).
251 Id. § 36.03(a)(1) (“A person commits an offense if by means of coercion he: (1) influences or attempts
to influence a public servant in a specific exercise of his official power or a specific performance of his official
duty . . . .”).
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Section 36.03(c) actually creates an exception to § 36.03(a)(1), exempting a
political actor from prosecution under § 36.03 where “the person who . . .
[speaks coercively] . . . is a member of the governing body . . . and that the . . .
[coercive action] is an official action taken by” that government actor.252
Section 36.03(c), however, cannot protect Governor Perry’s threat, because
while making the veto itself may constitute an official action, the act of
threatening to use one’s official power (vetoing a law) is not an official
action.253 Therefore, because the statute targets the act of making a threat, as
opposed to targeting official action or the content of the threat itself, § 36.03
would fall into the second Robertson category, and a court would proceed to
step two.
Under step two of a Robertson analysis, a presiding court should find the
statute overbroad because it encompasses a broad range of protected speech.254
Similar to the challenged statute in Robertson, neither § 1.07(9) nor § 36.03
require the conduct threatened to be wrongful.255 The Texas statute
encompasses a vast array of constitutionally protected activity within its scope,
and therefore criminalizes many types of ordinary political communication.256
Additionally, the Texas Court of Appeals in Hanson explicitly stated that
“coercion of a lawful act by a threat of lawful action is protected free
expression.”257 As they currently stand, § 1.07(9) and § 36.03 infringe upon
that definition of protected free expression. Therefore, the statute should be
found unconstitutionally overbroad.
Had the Texas Court of Appeals decided to follow Robertson, it would then
have proceeded to step three, and (as it did do correctly in its July 2015 order),
invalidated and returned the statute to the Texas legislature.258 The legislature
made its intent evident by altering the statute multiple times, but that intent
252

Id. § 36.03(c) (West 2011).
Id.; Volokh, supra note 195 (explaining that § 36.03 “appears to apply just to actions, not to the
influencing person’s threats of action; indeed, the premise of the Perry prosecution must be that a mere threat
of a veto isn’t an ‘official action’”).
254 See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 1.07(9), 36.03(a)(1) (West 2011).
255 State v. Robertson, 649 P.2d 569, 579 (Or. 1982); see TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 1.07(9), 36.03(a)(1)
(West 2011).
256 Expert Amicus Brief, supra note 8, at 14 (explaining that the prosecution’s view of the statute “would
make it illegal for[] a legislator to tell the Governor, ‘if you appoint John Smith to this position, I won’t vote
for this law you want me to support’ [or] for a Governor to tell a legislator, ‘if you don’t amend this bill in a
particular way, I’ll veto it’”).
257 State v. Hanson, 793 S.W.2d 270, 272–73 (Tex. App. 1990) (citing Wurtz v. Risley, 719 F.2d 1438,
1441 (9th Cir. 1983)); see also Volokh, supra note 195.
258 See State v. Robertson, 649 P.2d 569, 590 (Or. 1982).
253
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created an unconstitutionally overbroad statute.259 Therefore, a presiding judge
could not revise the statute to render it constitutional without “trespassing” on
the obvious legislative intent.260 That court should thus return the statute to the
legislature with an express command to narrow its language by, for instance,
adding the word “unlawful” to avoid overbreadth.261
B. Limiting and Narrowing Coercion Statutes in Other States
As shown, a Robertson analysis would have been the best option for the
Texas Court of Appeals to address the state’s coercion statute’s overbreadth.
However, overbroad coercion statutes currently exist in other states, and
unchecked state prosecutorial power is a nationwide problem. Therefore,
defendants, judges, and legislators in other states will likely face future
challenges because of these issues. This section argues why and how these
individuals should act proactively against overbroad coercion statutes.
Governor Perry’s defense team was right to raise an overbreadth challenge
to his indictment. Similarly, future defendants indicted under overbroad
coercion statutes across the country have a duty to themselves and, frankly, to
their states’ constitutions, to bring such challenges. State courts should then
evaluate these assertions under a Robertson-style analysis.262 If the defendants
raise these challenges, and judiciaries respond with Robertson-style analyses,
these statutes can be invalidated and narrowed—no longer posing a political
temptation to unchecked prosecutors.
The best approach for states who do not face current legal challenges to
their coercion statutes would be for their own legislatures to act proactively to
narrow their individual state’s coercion statute. The Texas House of

259

Volokh, supra note 195; see TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 1.07(9), 36.03 (West 2011).
Greenawalt, supra note 62, at 1089 (explaining that the Robertson court determined that to save the
statute, it would have to write in specific expansions, which would not only “trespass on the legislative
function” but also create an impermissibly vague statute).
261 Robertson, 649 P.2d at 590; see supra note 62 and accompanying text.
262 This argument raises the risk of being criticized for promoting judicial activism. However, this
criticism would be unwarranted for two reasons: (1) state legislatures failed to narrow these statutes, thus
prompting judiciary action, and (2) courts have an established history of protecting First Amendment
expression. David E. Bernstein, Antidiscrimination Laws and the First Amendment, 66 MO. L. REV. 83, 139
(2001) (“[A]bdication of judicial duty to enforce the First Amendment should be at least as objectionable and
scary to legal commentators as judicial activism. . . . [J]udges have a constitutional duty to enforce . . . rights to
free speech, free exercise, and free association . . . .”); David Yassky, Eras of the First Amendment,
91 COLUM. L. REV. 1699, 1737–38 (1991) (“The rules of law governing what is and is not ‘speech,’ and what
speech is protected, have been generated by the Court itself.”).
260
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Representatives, for example, includes a Criminal Jurisprudence Committee,
whose responsibilities include revising and amending the Texas Penal Code.263
That committee should have acted proactively to limit the unconstitutionally
overbroad coercion statute.
The Perry prosecution should indicate to legislators the breadth of
prosecutorial charging power against members of the government. If
prosecutors can bring a felony coercion charge against a controversial, but
arguably popular, three-term governor, such charges could be similarly levied
against other officials free from challenges or oversight.
CONCLUSION
There seems to be no indication that the crime control model currently
dominating American criminal procedure is on its way out of vogue.264
Prosecutors continue to enjoy unchecked power in bringing charges against
individuals—presenting a serious concern for legislators, governors, and
judges265 in states with overbroad coercion statutes. If prosecutors are able to
bring charges against their political opponents under these overbroad coercion
statutes, they could easily distort what is already a skewed balance of power in
their favor. Prosecutors face few meaningful checks from legislators,266
judges,267 or executives,268 yet, as this Comment has argued, the threat of
indictment for making a political threat may be one of the most powerful forms
of leverage that prosecutors can legally exert on these individuals.
Additionally, should the indictment go forward, prosecutors will be entitled to
the use of even more coercive leverage through plea bargaining, as earlier
discussed.269

263

TEX. LEGIS. COUNCIL, TEXAS HOUSE RULES: 84TH LEGISLATURE 25 (Jan. 15, 2015), http://www.house.
state.tx.us/_media/pdf/hrrules.pdf (“The committee shall have seven members, with jurisdiction over all
matters pertaining to: (1) criminal law, prohibitions, standards, and penalties . . . [and] (4) revision or
amendment of the Penal Code . . . .”).
264 See, e.g., Gershman, supra note 123, at 393.
265 See, e.g., State v. Hanson, 793 S.W.2d 270, 271 (Tex. App. 1990); see also Ex parte James Richard
“Rick” Perry, No. 03-15-00063-CR, 2015 WL 4514696, at *26 (Tex. Ct. App. July 24, 2015) (“[I]t has
occurred to the members of this panel that . . . section 36.03(a)(1) [(Texas’s coercion statute)] would
seemingly put at risk that time-honored practice whereby one justice will seek changes to another justice’s
draft majority opinion by threatening to write a dissent exposing flaws in the other’s legal reasoning.”).
266 See supra notes 151–53 and accompanying text.
267 See supra notes 154–58 and accompanying text.
268 See infra note 280 and accompanying text.
269 See supra note 135.
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Prosecutors have already begun to use charging discretion and power to
gain control over corporations through threats of prosecution.270 Federal
prosecutors use deferred prosecution agreements in which they decide to
suspend charges against a corporation so long as that company complies with
the terms of the government’s agreement.271 Because corporations will face
charges if they do not cooperate precisely with prosecutors’ demands,
prosecutors can prevent them from engaging in certain legal lines of business,
force them to change business practices, and control hiring and firing
decisions.272 As prosecutorial power has expanded in the last decade and a
half, the number of these deferred prosecution agreements has skyrocketed.273
Similarly, overbroad coercion statutes offer prosecutors an opportunity to
exercise control over political actors.274 Agreements in politics are frequently
based on the exertion of political leverage, and—for better or for worse—these
agreements are an inherent part of the country’s political atmosphere.275 It is
not impossible to imagine that prosecutors could one day use the threat of
prosecution against adverse political party members to force certain behavior,
as they already have against corporate entities through deferred prosecution
agreements.276
Although state legislatures may not previously have had the incentive to
limit prosecutorial power,277 the Perry prosecution as well as the growth of
prosecutorial regulation of corporations should provide them with sufficient
motivation. Legislators must take note that Governor Perry, the Republican
chief executive of a conservative state278 and a one-time presidential
candidate,279 could not force a Democratic District Attorney in one county of
270 See, e.g., Noah A. Gold, Corporate Criminal Liability: Cooperate, and You Won’t Be Indicted, 8 GEO.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 147, 156 (2010) (“The strikingly broad rule for corporate criminal liability, together with
the ‘inherent vulnerability of corporations’ to market pressures, gives prosecutors tremendous leverage over
corporations employing individuals suspected of criminal wrongdoing.”).
271 Id. at 157.
272 Rachel E. Barkow, Criminal Law as Regulation, 8 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 316, 326 (2014).
273 Id. at 325 (explaining that in the last thirteen years, 250 deferred prosecution agreements have been
negotiated whereas only eleven were negotiated between 1993 and 2001).
274 See supra Part II.A.
275 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
276 See supra note 273 and accompanying text.
277 See Bibas, supra note 123, at 967.
278 See, e.g., Meet Rick Perry, PERRY FOR PRESIDENT, www.rickperry.org/about/ (last visited Oct. 6, 2015)
(“As the . . . longest-serving governor of the Lone Star State, he championed conservative principles that
helped Texas become America’s economic engine.”).
279 See, e.g., Kenneth P. Vogel, Rick Perry Ramps Up for 2016, POLITICO (Nov. 28, 2014, 6:51 PM),
http://www.politico.com/story/2014/11/rick-perry-2016-campaign-113210.html.
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his state to resign her position, yet her office could level felony charges against
him for his attempt to force her resignation.280 Like corporate actors, legislators
and other politicians are “uniquely vulnerable”281 to prosecution because of
their status as public actors, and the possible resulting consequences to their
careers and future political ambitions.282 Although the indictment did not
directly derail Governor Perry’s presidential campaign, it is worth noting that
he suspended his campaign in September 2015, a little more than a year after
the indictment.283
It is telling that the Texas Court of Appeals implicitly recognized the
potential for abuse inherent to overbroad coercion statutes.284 The court quoted
the Supreme Court in its decision to invalidate the statute, stating, “We would
not uphold an unconstitutional statute merely because the Government
promised to use it responsibly.”285 It is significant that the Court of Appeals
chose to invalidate the overbroad statute, but it nevertheless failed to seize an
opportunity to meaningfully address the dangerous collision between
unchecked state prosecutors and overbroad state coercion statutes. In the
atmosphere of nearly unlimited prosecutorial charging discretion, setting a
strong state court precedent limiting coercion statutes could in turn limit state
prosecutorial power throughout the county.
280 See Griffin et al., supra note 199 (“Lehmberg pleaded guilty to DWI, served nearly three weeks in jail,
went to rehab and then went back to her job as the district attorney, able to ignore the calls for her to step
down. The felony charges against Perry are much more serious and would not allow him such latitude were he
to be found guilty. . . . [T]he maximum sentence for both [charges amounts to] more than 100 years in
prison.”).
281 See Benjamin M. Greenblum, Note, What Happens to a Prosecution Deferred? Judicial Oversight of
Corporate Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1863, 1885 (2005) (explaining that
corporations are willing to participate in and cooperate with this regulation-through-prosecution because of
their “unique vulnerability to adverse publicity and collateral consequences”).
282 See, e.g., Errol Louis, Does Rick Perry’s Indictment Disqualify Him for 2016?, CNN (Oct. 31, 2014,
1:00 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/08/18/opinion/louis-rick-perry-indictment/ (“[Perry’s] indictment may
scare away some potential supporters, making it harder for him to line up donations and early political support
in this crucial pre-election season. And a conviction—highly unlikely but possible—would surely end Perry’s
presidential hopes.”); see also Forrest Burnson, “Indicted but Not Convicted” Is a Form of Punishment, TEX.
TRIB. (July 30, 2010), http://www.texastribune.org/2010/07/30/indicted-but-not-convicted-is-a-form-ofpunishment/ (explaining that in the vast amount of time it takes to pursue cases, “the public is left to decide the
immediate fate of an indicted-but-not-convicted elected official, whose career can be destroyed by a state of
limbo”).
283 Theodore Schleifer, Rick Perry Drops Out of Presidential Race, CNN (Sept. 11, 2015, 9:47 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2015/09/11/politics/rick-perry-2016-campaign-suspended/ (noting that among other
campaign woes, “Back in Texas, he remained under indictment on an abuse-of-power charge”).
284 Ex parte James Richard “Rick” Perry, No. 03-15-00063-CR, 2015 WL 4514696, at *31 (Tex. Ct. App.
July 24, 2015).
285 Id. (citing United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 480 (2010)).
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As the Texas Court of Appeals seemed to recognize, legislators and judges
have a vested interest in supporting the type of speech that goes hand-in-hand
with “politics as usual.”286 Overbroad laws potentially limit American political
discourse, suggested Professor John L. Diamond: “If criminal prosecution is
politically motivated and existing statutory crime can be molded to cover
behavior that is not clearly treated or perceived as criminal, the freedom of the
political process itself can be placed in jeopardy.”287 Where prosecutors can
“stretch” statutes to cover actions that are “indistinguishable from generally
practiced behavior,”288 criminal prosecution becomes a very real possibility for
any government or political actor (as well as the ordinary citizen).
Legislators need not place direct legislative limitations on prosecutors.
Instead, before the challenges reach the courts, legislators have a duty to
themselves, to their constituents, and to their fellow politicians to proactively
narrow overbroad coercion statutes to prohibit only wrongful conduct outlined
in specific, clear language that does not touch protected First Amendment
communication.289
Although prosecutors may object to this solution and be reluctant to part
with their charging power under overbroad coercion statutes, this solution will
benefit them in the long term. This Comment assumes that most prosecutors do
not acquire their positions in order to punish their political opponents; instead,
such prosecutors probably hope to enforce just and constitutionally appropriate
laws, and to make wise charging decisions. However, even a few prosecutors
who use their power to pursue politically motivated indictments can tarnish the
reputations of others and cast doubt on their charging decisions.290 As
commentator Sandra Caron George explained, many prosecutors “have been
accused of using their broad discretion to achieve political goals or advance
their own political ambitions.”291 The Governor Perry indictment resulted in a
sweeping condemnation of the Travis County office and democratically
leaning prosecutors,292 and could very well damage Democratic interests in the
286

See id. at 58; see also State v. Hanson, 793 S.W.2d 270, 273 (Tex. App. 1990).
Diamond, supra note 7, at 2. Though Diamond focuses his article on bribery statutes, his argument can
be applied to overbroad coercion statutes.
288 Id. at 30.
289 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Am. Coal. of Life Activists, 945 F. Supp. 1355, 1381 (D. Or. 1996);
supra note 102.
290 See, e.g., infra notes 292–94 and accompanying text.
291 Sandra Caron George, Prosecutorial Discretion: What’s Politics Got to Do With It?, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 739, 740 (2005).
292 See, e.g., Pulliam, supra note 170; Texas Chainsaw Prosecution, supra note 210.
287

ROSENWASSER GALLEYSPROOFS2

2015]

1/14/2016 2:37 PM

A TROUBLING COLLISON

659

upcoming years.293 Similarly, just a few years ago, a prosecution against
former Senator John Edwards drew claims from the left of a politically
motivated, Republican-biased prosecution.294 Prosecutors have a strong
incentive to appear “rigorously detached”295 from politics; in remaining
“detached,” they can retain the public trust in an age of hyper-partisanship and
inspire confidence in the nation’s judicial system.
In conclusion, overbroad coercion statutes are not only unconstitutional,
but they also are potentially harmful to members of the judicial, legislative,
and executive branches, including prosecutors. By limiting overbroad coercion
statutes through judicial decisions following the Robertson framework and
through legislative action, courts and legislatures can limit unchecked
prosecutorial power, prevent some political prosecutions, and set state law
precedent ensuring the protection of political discourse across the nation.
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Lind, supra note 212.
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